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Abstract of the Dissertation
What is Opposition Good For?
by
Betul Demirkaya
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2016
Professor Matthew Gabel, Chair

Democratically elected governments may sometimes give in to pressures from extreme constituents thereby failing to adopt policies congruent with the median voter’s preferences.
This situation is exacerbated by the inability or the reluctance of voters to acquire information about the consequences of policy alternatives. Opposition parties, in principle, could
help remedy this problem using the prerogatives at their disposal such as participating in
legislative debates and proposing bills, amendments or no confidence motions. In practice,
however, they may have incentives to mislead the voters for policy or election purposes.
Given the critical role of opposition parties to remedy problems of incongruence, it is essential to gain theoretical clarity and empirical knowledge as to when and how opposition
parties use the tools available to them in legislatures. My dissertation contributes to the
recently growing literature that studies the behavior of opposition parties in different institutional contexts, and the implications of that behavior for democratic representation. In
particular, I examine the conditions under which opposition parties provide the voters with
accurate information, thereby inducing the government to act in accordance with voters’
demands and interests. My analysis reconsiders the conventional wisdom that the influence
of opposition parties on policy making is commensurate with their electoral strength or seat
share in the legislature.
vii

In the first paper, I develop a formal model that examines the interaction between a
government with control over a policy proposal and an opposition party faced with the
decision whether to attract voters’ attention to the proposal by objecting to its adoption. The
model assumes that the government has incentives to pursue policies divergent from voter
preferences and that voters face non-trivial costs in monitoring the government’s legislative
proposals. Voters can use the objection of the opposition party as a signal to identify adverse
government proposals. However, for the mechanism to work, the opposition party should
be responsible, i.e. not alarm the voters too frequently. I show that confrontation between
the government and the opposition party is more likely when the chances of election for
the opposition party are sufficiently low and the opposition activists are sufficiently distant
in terms of their ideological positions from the government (as well as the voter and the
opposition party itself). In addition to providing useful signals, the presence of a responsible
opposition party may increase voters’ welfare by inducing the government to preemptively
adjust its policies.
In the second paper, I propose a formal model that explores whether the voters can
receive accurate information from the opposition party under further constraints. More
specifically, the model assumes that the voters do not have the means to verify the accuracy
of information they receive about the policy and furthermore they have limited information
about the preferences of the government and the opposition party. I show that the opposition
party can discipline the government to choose policies congruent with voters’ preferences if
the reputation of the opposition is high and the benefit of policy to the government is small
relative to the benefit of winning elections. Under the same conditions, however, misleading
messages of the opposition party may cause a good government to implement policies that
bring about bad outcomes for the voters.
In the the third paper, I examine when legislators withdraw their support from the
bills that they cosponsored using an original dataset of cosponsorship in the US House
viii

of Representatives. I argue that the legislators take into account the preferences of their
constituency in their cosponsorship decisions. Since acquiring information about the bills
is costly, legislators use the cosponsorship decisions of their counterparts as signals for the
acceptability of the bill for their constituency. My analysis shows that there is a relationship
between the partisan composition of cosponsors and the likelihood that he/she decides to
remove his/her name from the bill later. More specifically, a legislator is less likely to remove
his/her name from a bill that he/she cosponsored as the difference between the number
of his/her partisans that cosponsored the bill and the number of his/her opponents that
cosponsored the bill increases.

ix

Chapter 1
Introduction

The merits of a democratic political system stem from the opportunities it provides for
the representation of everyone in the polity; therefore, a sound and viable opposition is
one of its indispensable elements. Opposition parties obviously serve as alternatives for
discontented voters; however, their function is more than just providing another emblem on
the ballot in the next elections. They provide information about the government’s policies,
and point to their weaknesses. They express the demands and interests of their constituency,
and contribute to the translation of these demands and interests into policy. In a political
system with a functioning opposition, the government is expected to be more responsive to
the demands of the population as a whole; however, there may be both institutional and
motivational obstacles against the opposition’s performance of these ideal functions.
Despite the important function attributed to the opposition parties, there is a perception
that they have very little, if any, chance of directly influencing policy decisions. In parliamentary systems, the party or the coalition that has the majority of seats in the parliament
has control over both legislative and executive power. Especially in cases with high levels of
party discipline, the party in the majority usually does not have difficulty passing the bills
that it proposes and the opposition’s votes in the legislature cannot change the result. Nev1

ertheless, the opposition parties have the opportunity to participate in legislative debates,
during which they can reveal their policy positions and offer alternatives to government’s
policy. The opposition’s criticism of the government’s policies may help voters acquire information about or have new perspective on policy outcomes. In that case, the government may
have to adjust its policies in accordance with the voters’ demands. Hence, opposition parties
have the potential to influence policy decisions even when they do not have the majority of
the seats required to change the result of legislative voting.
While the information provision function of the opposition is promising for a more responsive political system, the incentives of the opposition parties may be incompatible with
this function. The opposition parties may have policy preferences that are incongruent with
the voters. They may benefit from responding to the demands of the party activists that
advocate extreme positions. Moreover, they may be unwilling to release information that
could help the government’s reelection chances. Given these motivational constraints, it is
important to identify the conditions under which the presence of a legislative opposition
enhances the responsiveness of the government.
In the next chapter, I develop a formal model that examines the conditions under which
the opposition’s objections to policy proposals help voters to monitor the government. The
model assumes that the opposition needs to exert effort to attract the attention of voters, who
face nontrivial costs to evaluate information. I show that an electorally strong opposition
with moderate activists may fail to warn voters against policy proposals that diverge from
the voters’ preferences. On the other hand, if the opposition is electorally weak or has
extreme activists, its messages lose credibility.
In the third chapter, I consider a situation where voters lack information about the
policy preferences of the parties and the consequences of policy alternatives. Uncertainty
2

about the government’s preferences makes it difficult for the voters to hold the government
accountable. I propose a formal model that explores whether an opposition party can help
solve this problem by providing information about policy alternatives. The model shows
that the presence of an opposition party may induce an incongruent government to adjust
its policies as long as the reputation of the opposition is sufficiently high, and the government
is sufficiently concerned about reelection. When the voter does not have the means to verify
the accuracy of information, however, misleading information of the opposition may cause a
congruent government to implement policies that are detrimental to voter welfare.
In the fourth chapter, I use cosponsorship patterns in the US House of Representatives
to analyze how the legislators respond to the demands of their constituency. In particular,
I analyze when the legislators withdraw their support from the bills that they cosponsored.
I argue that the legislators use cosponsorship to signal their policy positions and that they
use the cosponsorship decisions of their counterparts to evaluate the content of the bills. My
analysis shows that a legislator is more likely to withdraw his/her support if the number of
cosponsors from the opposite party increases relative to the number of his/her copartisan
cosponsors.

3

Chapter 2
Whistleblower in the Parliament

“A common theme in studies of European politics has been ‘the decline of
parliaments,’ which have everywhere, according to some perceptions, lost to the
grasping hands of governments the power they supposedly possessed late in the
nineteenth century. By the middle of the twentieth century, it was generally agreed
that governments acted while parliaments just talked.” (Gallagher et al. 2006)
“A weak parliament is the other face of strong government. What this means
in practice was once nicely described (by Austin Mitchell MP in his splendidly
entertaining Westminster Man) as like ‘heckling a steamroller’. The heckling is
loud and raucous, at least from the opposition parties, but the executive steamroller takes it all in its stride and gets on with its governing business.” (Wright
2013)

2.1

Introduction

Parliamentary activities such as plenary debates and oral questions have long been dismissed
as spectacles with little consequence for policy outcomes by politicians as well as political
scientists. Parties in government certainly have exceptional power over legislation, especially
in cases with majority governments or high party discipline. An exclusive emphasis on the
executive, however, would result in failing to identify the role that the legislature may play
in policymaking. Recent studies that study the role of the legislature mostly limit their
attention to committees, particularly as a tool for coalition partners to monitor each other
(Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011; Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Fortunato et al. forth4

coming). According to these studies, there is little room for opposition parties to influence
policy. Opposition parties matter only to the extent that they can bargain with minority
governments over legislation or modify policy through committee work. Hence, opposition
parties’ influence is proportional to their seat share in the parliament and contingent on
the presence of a minority government or a strong committee system (Strom 1990; Powell
2000; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011). In this paper, I take a different approach that
considers whether the opposition’s parliamentary activities may have an indirect impact on
policy outcomes by mobilizing public opinion.
In parliamentary systems, opposition parties use procedural prerogatives at their disposal
such as proposing bills, amendments or no confidence motions, usually without a successful
outcome. Even when amendments do not pass or no confidence motions fail, they may
serve as useful signals to voters about the government’s policy proposals. These signals are
particularly important for government responsiveness given the fact that voters usually do
not pay attention to or know much about policy alternatives (Campbell 1960; Carpini and
Keeter 1997). In the absence of an informed and interested constituency, parties in office
may be tempted to deviate from policies that are the most beneficial for voters (Mansbridge
2003; Powell 2004). Empirical evidence shows that parties usually take positions that are
more extreme than those taken by their constituents (Iversen 1994). This deviation may
result from the discrepancy between the preferences of the party leadership and those of the
constituency. In addition, even when the leaders are moderate, they may need to appeal to
the more extreme positions of party activists that provide the party with important resources
(Schofield and Sened 2006; Schumacher et al 2013).
In order to see how an opposition party can induce the government to act in accordance
with public opinion, consider the Conservative-Liberal-Dem coalition’s climb-down on the
reorganization of the National Health System in UK. When asked a question in 2005 about
voters’ possible reaction to his plans for reducing the size of the state, David Cameron
5

answered: “I don’t think anyone gets out of bed in the morning, and thinks, ‘I wish the
state was smaller tomorrow than it is today.’ Of course not.” (Financial Times, December
18, 2015). When the Health and Social Care Act was first proposed, there was hardly any
attention to the bill from the general public (Economist, April 7, 2011). After a period of
debate led by the Labor Party (the main opposition party), the bill had to go through several
changes. Cameron had to admit the problems with the bill: “Politicians aren’t very good at
saying, we didn’t get it right first time. ... But actually I think people respect a government
that feels it is strong enough to say, hold on, we haven’t got every element right, we’re not
taking enough people with us, let’s stop, let’s get this right.” (The Guardian, June 14, 2011)
Due largely to the efforts of the opposition party, the issue became salient among voters who
did not necessarily think about the size of the state first thing in the morning. As a result,
Cameron had to adjust his party’s policy to align with the public opinion.
The example shows that the opposition’s parliamentary activities may be influential even
in the British Parliament, which has been described as a “notoriously impotent legislature.”
(Martin and Vanberg 2011:133)1 It does not suggest that the government will always take
into account the opinion of the opposition party. Just like the government, the opposition
party has incentives to cater to its extreme constituents, which makes it harder for the
opposition to send credible messages to voters. In this paper, I propose a formal model that
identifies the conditions under which the voters pay attention to the opposition’s objections to
the government’s policy proposals. The model assumes that the government has incentives
to pursue policies divergent from voter preferences, that voters face non-trivial costs in
monitoring the government’s legislative proposals, and that the opposition party must exert
effort to attract the voters’ attention.
1

Eggers and Spirling (2014) argue that governments in the nineteenth century UK were able to limit the
formal agenda-setting powers of the opposition only because they engaged the opposition in the parliament
at increasing levels in return.

6

The model in this paper contributes to an extensive body of formal theory literature
on electoral accountability.2 In these models, the voters face the problem of monitoring the
government in an environment where they have limited information about the consequence of
policy alternatives as well as the characteristics of the government. Based on the policy of the
government and the message of the opposition (if any), the voters update their information
about the competence of the government (Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts 2001; Prat 2005,
Ashworth and Shotts 2010; Ashworth and Shotts 2015) or its policy preferences (Maskin and
Tirole 2004; Lemon 2005; Fox 2007). The main question is whether the reelection concerns
of the government will induce the government to choose the right policy for the voters.
Similar to these models, I identify the conditions under which the government chooses the
right policy for the voters; however, the voters in my model are facing a different problem.
They have to decide whether to exert effort to acquire information about the policy. The
government backs down from the proposal and incurs a reputation cost if the voters find
out the policy proposal does not align with their interests. The question is whether the
opposition can help the voters to identify policy proposals that are worth their attention.
The design of the model in this paper is similar to previous work on compliance in the
judiciary, in which a whistleblower can induce the higher court to review the decisions of
a lower court (Beim et al. 2014). The key finding of their model is that the presence of
the whistleblower would increase compliance only when whistleblowing is rare enough. This
captures the critical tension of representative government where the majority has immense
power and minority can only talk. But it leaves other questions unanswered. The differences
between a whistleblower in the judiciary and an opposition party in the parliament are as
follows: First, unlike the whistleblower in the judiciary, the opposition party has the chance
of winning elections and making the policy in a second period. Second, in making their
2

For an excellent review of this literature, see Ashworth 2012.

7

decisions both the opposition and the government have to consider the reaction of their
respective party activists, which usually have more extreme policy preferences.

3

The model shows how the election chances of the opposition and the ideological position
of its activists influence the frequency and the credibility of its messages. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, an electorally strong opposition party with moderate activists may
not bring about the best outcome for voters’ welfare. When the opposition is sufficiently
likely to win the next election, instead of paying the cost to object to the policy proposal,
it may wait until the next term to overturn policy. Similarly, when the party activists are
moderate, the position-taking advantage of objecting to policy proposals will be smaller. On
the other hand, if the election chances of the opposition are too small or its activists are
too extreme, voters will not take the messages of the opposition seriously. Hence, there is
a sweet spot where the reelection chances of the opposition and the distance of its activists
from the government are moderate enough for the opposition to be effective.

2.2

Model

2.2.1

Players

In order to answer the questions listed above, I consider a model in which the government
chooses between two policy proposals – liberal or conservative – and the opposition party
decides whether to object to the proposal by paying cost c > 0. If the opposition chooses to
object to the proposal, the voter decides whether to pay attention to the proposal by paying
3
Ting (2008) provides another model on whistleblowing. In his model, the principal decides how much
authority to give to the agent over the whistleblower. The preferences of the actors are over the quality of
the work that partially depends on the effort of the whistleblower.

8

cost t > 0.4 Both c and t are common knowledge. To facilitate exposition, I will use female
pronouns for the government and male pronouns for the opposition and the voter.

2.2.2

Policy Preferences

All three players care about policy. Their preferred policies depend on their respective
indifference points and the state of the world, ω. More specifically, the utility of a player
i−ω
while her utility
with indifference point i from a conservative policy in each period is
2
ω−i
from a liberal policy is
. This means that each player prefers a liberal policy for values
2
of ω greater than her indifference point, and a conservative policy otherwise. For example,
we can think of ω as the cost of war. For each actor, if the cost exceeds a certain level,
going to war would be the less-preferred option. The difference between the utility that an
actor receives from the preferred policy and the less-preferred policy is |ω − i|. Hence, as the
state of the world moves away from an actor’s indifference point, the relative benefit of the
preferred policy increases. For example, the benefit of avoiding a war would be higher for a
liberal actor when the war is more costly.
I set the indifference point of the government to 0. The voter’s and the opposition’s
indifference points are V and X, where X > V > 0. This means that the opposition is more
conservative than the government but the results would hold if the reverse were the case.
The voter is placed between the government and the opposition. The indifference points
of all three players are common knowledge. The state of the world, ω, is known by the
government and the opposition. The voter finds out the value of ω only if he chooses to pay
4

Note that in the model, the voter does not have the option to pay attention unless the opposition chooses
to object to the proposal. In real life, the voters may certainly pay attention to an issue without being warned
by the opposition party. The activities of the opposition party is one of the several signals that can help
voters identify issues that deserve attention. The focus of this paper is to identify conditions under which
the presence of an opposition party enhances government responsiveness. Therefore, the model is limited
to cases in which the voter would not have paid attention to an issue in the absence of an action by the
opposition. We can think of the model as a simplified form of a model where the opposition party increases
the probability that the voter will pay attention to an issue.
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the cost t. Otherwise, he only knows that ω is drawn from a uniform distribution U [ω, ω̄],
where ω < 0 and ω̄ > X. The policy preferences of the actors are shown in figure 2.1. For
example, the voter will prefer a conservative policy for values of ω smaller than his ideal
point (V ) but a liberal policy otherwise.
Figure 2.1: Policy Preferences

2.2.3

Policies

The game consists of two periods. Depending on the actions of the players, the policy implemented in the first period is as follows: If the opposition does not object to the government’s
proposal or the voter does not pay attention, the proposal becomes the policy. If the opposition objects to the proposal and manages to direct voter’s attention to the issue, the
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government has to implement the voter’s preferred policy.

5

If this policy is different from

the proposal, i.e. the government has to climb down, she pays a climb-down cost d > 0.
At the end of the first period, an election is held and the opposition wins the election with
probability β. If the government stays in power, the second-period policy stays the same
as the first period. If the opposition is elected as the new government, the second-period
policy depends on whether the voter paid attention to the proposal in the first period. If the
voter didn’t pay attention, the opposition implements his preferred policy without incurring
any cost. If the voter did, the opposition has to implement the voter’s preferred policy. In
addition, he has to pay a climb-down cost dO > 0 if he objected to the voter’s favorite policy
in the first period.
The probability of the opposition’s election, β, is an exogenous parameter because the
opposition’s election chances may be influenced by a broad set of factors beyond the individual policy in question. For example, it is influenced by valence issues such as the personal
characteristics of the party leader or the state of the economy. It is reasonable to expect
that the government’s election chances will decrease when the it has to climb-down. The
same should apply to the opposition if it is caught giving a false alarm. The most obvious
implication of this would be to tame the government and the opposition, i.e. induce them to
implement (or recommend) congruent policies for fear of not being reelected. This is already
captured in the model by the climb-down cost.6
5

In cases where the voters do not have the means to put enough pressure on the government to change
policy, it is not possible for the opposition party to influence policy outcome through the mechanism suggested
in the paper. We can consider a model that gives the incumbent the option to stick to its policy proposal
(at some cost). It does not change the comparative statics of the model.
6

The influence of β that I would like to capture in the model is different. The electoral strength of
the opposition party influences its behavior in two ways: First, high prospects for being elected gives the
opposition a certain degree of responsibility because it will most likely be decision-maker in the future, and be
held accountable for what it said in the first period. Second, high prospects for election gives the opposition
party an opportunity to change the policy, which reduces its incentives to make a fuss over less important
issues. For these two mechanisms, whether β is endogenous or not does not make a difference.

11

2.2.4

Utility

All three players receive utility from the policy chosen as described in section 2.2.2. The voter
only receives utility from the first period policy.

7

The government and the opposition receive

utility from the policies in both periods. In addition, the utility functions of the government
and the opposition have a position-taking component that captures the incentives of the
players’ to please their party activists that have more extreme policy preferences compared to
voters.8 The government activists’ indifference point is denoted by AG < 0 and the opposition
activists’ indifference point is denoted by AO > X. The utility that the government activists
receive from the proposal (not the policy) is added to the government’s utility function. For
example, if the government proposes a conservative policy, the position-taking component
AG − ω
. The idea here is that the government can take credit for
of his utility will be
2
the position even in cases where she has to climb down because of opposition involvement.
Similarly, the opposition receives utility depending on the position he takes. If he objects
to a liberal proposal he will get the utility that the activists would get from a conservative
policy. If not, he will get the utility that the activists would get from the liberal proposal.
Similar logic applies if the opposition objects to a conservative proposal.

2.2.5

Sequence

The sequence of the game is as follows:
1. Nature chooses ω.
2. The government and the opposition observe ω.
7

We can think of the politicians as more farsighted than the voters. I made the decision not to include the
second-period utility mostly to simplify exposition. Including the second period policy utility changes the
expected benefit of attention in a way that does not add to our understanding of the motivating questions.
Note also that the voter can always decide to pay attention to policy after having observed a new government.
8

A similar approach is used by Martin and Vanberg 2005.
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3. The government chooses between a conservative or a liberal policy proposal.
4. (a) In the baseline model, the voter decides whether to pay attention at cost t.
(b) In the model with the opposition, the opposition decides whether to object to the
proposal at cost c. The voter decides whether to pay attention at cost t only if
the opposition objects to the proposal.

9

5. Payoffs are realized.
(a) If the voter pays attention, his favorite policy is adopted. The government has to
pay a climbdown cost d if the proposal is different from that policy.
(b) Otherwise, the proposal becomes policy.

2.2.6

Equilibrium Concept

The solution concept of the game is prefect Bayesian equilibrium, which requires specifying
the strategies of the three players and the voter’s beliefs. The government’s strategy involves
choosing a policy proposal for every possible value of the state of the world. The opposition’s
strategy involves deciding whether to object for every possible pair of state of the world and
proposal. The voter’s beliefs about the state of the world after having observed the policy
proposal should be consistent with the strategies of the government and the opposition. The
voter’s strategy is a decision whether to pay attention after each of the two policy proposals,
and it should be sequentially rational given his beliefs about the state of the world.
For both the baseline model and the model with the opposition, I am interested in two
types of equilibria depending on the voter’s strategy. In the equilibrium with an inattentive
voter, the voter’s strategy is to never pay attention to the policy. In the equilibrium with
9

The focus of this paper to identify the conditions under which the opposition may help voters to notice
the government’s incongruent policies in situations where paying attention to all policies is too costly for the
voter. Therefore, I simplify the model by limiting it to cases where the voter never pays attention when he
does not observe objection from from the opposition.
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an attentive voter, the voter’s strategy is to always pay attention after a liberal policy but
to never pay attention after a conservative policy. Recall that the focus of this paper is to
identify when the voter is able to prevent incongruent policies of the government because of
the opposition’s objections. Since the government is more liberal than the voter, the voter’s
concern would be to be careful about liberal policy proposals, not the conservative ones.

2.3

Equilibria in the Baseline Model

2.3.1

Baseline Equilibrium with Inattentive Voter

When the voter does not pay attention to the policy, the government’s only considerations are
the position-taking and policy benefits. When the preferred policies of the government and
her activists are the same, the decision is straightforward: to propose her preferred policy.
For values of ω between AG and 0 (the government’s indifference point), the government
has to weigh the position-taking benefit of proposing a liberal policy against the benefit she
will get from a conservative policy. She will propose a conservative policy if and only if
(2 − β)ω < AG − ω.
Proposition 1 (Baseline Equilibrium with Inattentive Voter) In the baseline model, there
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following strategies and beliefs:
• The government proposes a conservative policy for ω <

AG
,
3−β

and a liberal policy oth-

erwise.
h
i
AG
• The voter updates his belief to ω ∼ U ω, 3−β
after observing a conservative proposal,
h
i
AG
and to ω ∼ U 3−β
, ω̄ after observing a liberal proposal.
• The voter never pays attention to the policy proposal.
This equilibrium exists if and only if t > (V − E(ω|ω < V )) ∗ P r(ω < V ) given a liberal
policy proposal.
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In this equilibrium, for the values of ω where the government and the voter disagree on
policy, the government proposes her preferred policy. In addition, for some values of ω where
the government and the voter agree on a conservative policy, the government will be tempted
to propose a liberal policy in order to appease her activists. Since the proposal becomes the
policy, this equilibrium poses a problem for voter’s welfare.

2.3.2

Baseline Equilibrium with Attentive Voter

When the preferred policy of the government is the same as the preferred policy of both the
voter and the government activists, the choice of proposal for the government is straightforward. Since there is neither position-taking cost nor the risk of climb-down cost, the
government will propose her preferred policy. Hence, for values of ω smaller than AG , the
government will propose a conservative policy. When the value of ω is greater than V , she
will propose a liberal policy. For any value of ω in between, a liberal policy proposal will lead
to a climb down; however, it will bring position-taking benefit to the government. Taking
the climb-down cost and position-taking benefit into consideration, the government proposes
conservative policy if and only if ω < d + AG .
Proposition 2 (Baseline Equilibrium with Attentive Voter) In the baseline model, there
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following strategies and beliefs:
• The government proposes a conservative policy for ω < d + AG , and a liberal policy
otherwise.
• The voter updates his belief to ω ∼ U [ω, d + AG ] after observing a conservative proposal, and to ω ∼ U [d + AG , ω̄] after observing a liberal proposal.
• The voter always pays attention after the opposition’s objection to a liberal proposal
and never pays attention after the opposition’s objection to a conservative proposal.
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This equilibrium exists if and only if t < (V − E(ω|ω < V )) ∗ P r(ω < V ) given a liberal
policy proposal.

10

By the setup of the model, the voter receives the policy he prefers when he pays attention
to the policy. For the equilibrium to work, however, the expected benefit of paying attention
to the policy for the voter must be worth the cost of attention. For a range of ω values, the
government’s liberal proposal may indeed be the preferred policy for the voter. Hence, the
voter may be “wasting” his time to learn about the consequences of a policy if the government
is already acting in a congruent manner. That is why the presence of an opposition may help
increase the welfare of the voter. Ideally, an opposition party will always (and only) warn
the voter when the government proposes an incongruent policy. Throughout the paper, I
will refer to an opposition party that fails to warn the voter against an incongruent policy
proposal as insufficient opposition. If an opposition party alarms the voter unnecessarily
against a congruent policy proposal, I will refer to it as irresponsible opposition.

2.4
2.4.1

Equilibria in the Model with Opposition
Opposition Equilibrium with Inattentive Voter (Grandstanding Equilibrium)

In the equilibrium with an inattentive voter, the opposition knows that his action will not
have any effect on policy. The only incentive he has to object to a policy proposal is to
please his activists. Hence, he will object to a liberal proposal only if c < AO − ω and to a
conservative proposal only if c < ω − AO . The government’s strategy in the equilibrium with
inattentive voter is the same as his strategy in the baseline model. Given that the voter will
10

Note that for this condition to hold, d + AG has to be greater than V. Otherwise, the government would
be preemptively choosing a conservative policy for all values of ω smaller than V, in which case it would not
be sequentially rational for the voter to pay attention to a liberal policy. For the rest of the paper, I will
assume d + AG < V .
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not pay attention to the policy, government’s decision will be based only the preferences of
himself and his activists.
Given the strategies of the two players, we never observe an objection against a conservative proposal. Hence, the voter’s beliefs after an objection to a conservative proposal
cannot be pinned down by Bayes rule. Given that the government has incentive to propose
a conservative policy only when ω < 0, we assume that is the voter’s belief after observing
an objection to a conservative proposal. Consistent with the strategies of the two players,
voter believes that ω is uniformly distributed between

AG
3−β

and AO − c after having observed

an objection to a liberal proposal.
Proposition 3 (Grandstanding Equilibrium) In the model with opposition, there is a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following strategies and beliefs:
• The opposition objects to a liberal proposal if and only if c < AO − ω, and to a conservative proposal if and only if c < ω − AO .
• The government proposes a conservative policy for ω <

AG
,
3−β

and a liberal policy oth-

erwise.
• The voter updates his belief to ω ∼ U [ω, 0] after observing an objection to a conservative
h
i
AG
proposal, and to ω ∼ U 3−β , AO − c after observing an objection to a liberal proposal.
• The voter never pays attention to the policy proposal.
This equilibrium exists if and only if t > (V − E(ω|ω < V )) ∗ P r(ω < V ) given an objection
to a liberal policy proposal.
Two observations are important about the opposition equilibrium with an inattentive
voter. First, compared to the baseline model, the presence of an opposition that can object
to government proposals gives some information to the voter about the state of the world;
however, this information is not sufficient to convince the voter that it is worth his time to pay
17

attention to the policy. Second, in terms of the voter’s welfare, there is no difference between
the baseline model and the model with opposition as long as the voter is inattentive. The
confrontation between the government and the opposition does not amount to much other
than political grandstanding aimed at activists as the voter does not get any benefit.

2.4.2

Opposition Equilibrium with Attentive Voter (Informative
Equilibrium)

Opposition’s Strategy
Objection Against a Liberal Proposal When the state of the world, ω, is smaller than the
voter’s indifference point, the preferred policy of all three player is conservative. Hence,
objecting to a liberal proposal brings both position-taking and policy benefits to the opposition. If the cost of objection is smaller than the benefit, that is c < AO − ω + (2 − β)(X − ω),
the opposition will object to the proposal.
When ω is between the indifference points of the voter and the opposition, the preferred
policies of the voter and the opposition are not the same. Objecting to a liberal proposal
is not going to change the policy. Moreover, it has the downside of bringing the voter’s
attention to an issue on which the voter and the opposition do not agree. When the voter
is aware of the situation, the opposition will have to implement a conservative policy in the
second period in case he is elected. In addition, he will have to pay a climb-down cost.
Despite all the drawbacks, the opposition may object to a liberal policy if the positiontaking benefit is large enough. In particular, the opposition will object to the proposal if
c + β(X − ω) + dO β < AO − ω.
For values of ω greater than the indifference point of the opposition, the preferred policy of
the opposition is liberal. Hence there is no policy benefit to objecting to a liberal proposal.
If ω is smaller than the indifference point of the opposition activists, the opposition has
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position-taking incentive to please the activists. Yet this will bring a climb-down cost in
case the opposition is elected in the second period. Given all this, the opposition will object
to the proposal if c + dO β < AO − ω. If ω is greater than AO , the opposition will never object
to a liberal proposal.
Objection Against a Conservative Proposal In the informative equilibrium, the voter never
pays attention to the opposition’s objection against a conservative proposal. Therefore,
the policy component of the opposition’s utility function is irrelevant in his decision about
whether to object to a conservative proposal. All the opposition needs to take into account is
the position-taking incentive. The preferred policy of both the opposition and the opposition
activists is conservative for any value of ω smaller than AO . For other values of ω, the
opposition has to weigh the cost of objection against the position-taking benefit. He will
object to the proposal if c < ω − AO . Lemma 1 summarizes the opposition’s strategy.
Lemma 1 (Opposition’s Strategy) In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the voter
always pays attention after the opposition’s objection to a liberal proposal and never pays
attention after the opposition’s objection to a conservative proposal, the opposition objects to
• a liberal proposal if and only if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
– ω < V and c < AO − ω + (2 − β)(X − ω)
– V < ω < X and c < AO − ω − β(X − ω) − dO β
– X < ω < AO − c − dO β
• a conservative proposal if and only if ω > AO + c
Government’s Strategy
The government’s strategy involves choosing a policy proposal for every possible value of
the state of the world. When the preferred policy of the government is the same as the
preferred policy of both the voter and the government activists, the choice of proposal for
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the government is straightforward. Since there is neither position-taking cost nor the risk of
climb-down cost, the government will propose her preferred policy.
When ω is between the indifference points of the government activists and the voter, the
government has a position-taking incentive to propose a liberal policy against the interests
of the voter. The calculation of the government in this region will depend on whether ω
is in a region where the opposition will object to a liberal policy or not. If ω is in the
objection region specified in Lemma 1, the resulting policy will be conservative irrespective
of government’s proposal. Hence, the government only needs to weigh the climb-down cost
against the position-taking benefit. She will propose a conservative policy if the climb-down
cost is high enough, that is d > ω − AG . If ω is not in the objection region, the government’s
proposal becomes the policy without any climb-down cost. When ω is greater than the
government’s indifference point, he will propose a liberal policy since that is the preferred
policy of both the government and the government activists. Otherwise, the government
needs to consider the trade-off between pleasing the activists and getting her preferred policy.
She will propose a conservative policy if the influence of the activists is sufficient, that is
AG − ω > (2 − β)ω. Lemma 2 summarizes the government’s strategy.
Lemma 2 (Government’s Strategy) In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the voter
always pays attention after the opposition’s objection to a liberal proposal and never pays
attention after the opposition’s objection to a conservative proposal, government proposes
• a conservative policy if and only if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
– ω < AG
– AG < ω < AG + d and c < AO − ω + (2 − β)(X − ω)
– AG < ω <

AG
and c > AO − ω + (2 − β)(X − ω)
3−β

• a liberal policy otherwise.
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Voter’s Beliefs
Given the strategies of the opposition and the government, the voter never observes an
objection against a conservative policy in equilibrium (remember that the opposition is
assumed to be more conservative than the voter). The voter’s belief about ω cannot be
pinned down by the Bayes rule. Since the government only has an incentive to propose a
conservative policy when ω < 0, I will assume this is the voter’s belief after observing an
objection to a conservative proposal. Given this belief, it is sequentially rational for the
voter not to pay attention to an objection against a conservative proposal. In other words,
the voter does not need to spend effort trying to discipline the conservative proposals of a
government that is more liberal than himself.
There is a range of ω values for which the voter will observe an objection to a liberal
policy. I’ll examine these values in three separate regions that are different in terms of the
implications of paying attention for the voter’s welfare.
Government-Disciplining Region: For values of ω between AG and V voters prefer a
conservative policy but the government (which is more liberal than the voter and the opposition) has incentives to propose a liberal policy in order to please the activists. She
proposes a liberal policy even though she knows she will have to climb down. It does so
only when the position-taking benefit is worth it. We can define a preemption threshold
G∗ = d + AG below which the government preempts opposition by proposing a conservative
AO − c + (2 − β)X
, such that
policy. Similarly we can define an objection threshold, O1∗ =
3−β
the opposition objects to a liberal policy for any value of ω smaller than this threshold. In
the government-disciplining region, the benefit of paying attention for the voter is to correct
the government’s proposal.
Opposition-Disciplining Region: For values of ω between V and X, the government always
proposes a liberal policy. The opposition has incentive to object when the position-taking
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AO − c − dO β − βX
.
1−β
For the voter, the first-period benefit of paying attention to the proposal in this region is null
benefit is large enough. The objection threshold in this region is O2∗ =

since the government is already proposing the voter’s preferred policy. The second-period
benefit of paying attention, which is not included in the voter’s utility function, is to correct
the policy in case the opposition is elected in the second period.
False Alarm Region: Finally, for values of ω between X and AO , the opposition objects
to a liberal policy when ω is smaller than the objection threshold O3∗ = AO − c − dO β. There
is no benefit of paying attention to the policy in this region since the voter’s preferences are
aligned with both the government and the opposition.
Figure 2.2: Confrontation Regions

The objection thresholds defined above do not always fall into their relevant regions.
For instance, depending on the parameters of the game O1∗ may be greater than V , in
which case the opposition always objects in the government-disciplining region. Or O2∗ may
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be smaller than V in which case we never observe objection in the opposition-disciplining
region. Considering all these, the voter knows that he is in one of the four situations depicted
in figure 2.2 when he observes an objection.11 The bold lines show the possible values that
ω can take conditional on an objection against a liberal proposal. Lemma 3 summarizes the
voter’s belief based on these values.
Lemma 3 (Voter’s Beliefs) After observing an objection to a liberal policy, the voter’s
belief about ω, consistent with the government’s and the opposition’s strategies, is as follows:
• If O2∗ ≤ V then ω ∼ U [G∗ , min(O1∗ , V )]
• If V < O2∗ < X then ω ∼ U [G∗ , O2∗ ]
• If O2∗ ≥ X then ω ∼ U [G∗ , O3∗ ]
The last step before specifying the equilibrium is to check whether it is sequentially rational for the voter to pay attention to an objection against a liberal proposal. As mentioned
above, the voter benefits from paying attention to a proposal in the first period only if ω is in
the government-disciplining region. The benefit will be the absolute value of the difference
between the expected value of ω and voter’s indifference point.
Proposition 4 (Informative Equilibrium) Given the strategies and the beliefs specified
in Lemma 1-3, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the voter always pays attention
after the opposition’s objection to a liberal proposal and never pays attention after the opposition’s objection to a conservative proposal if and only if t < (V − E(ω|ω < V )) ∗ P r(ω < V )
given an objection to a liberal policy proposal.
11

See the lemma in the appendix about why other cases are eliminated.
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2.5
2.5.1

Comparative Statics
Probability of Election for Opposition (β)

The probability of election changes the way the opposition behaves in all three regions. In
the government-disciplining region, as the probability of election increases, the opposition is
less likely object to proposals that would only marginally hurt the voter. This is because
an opposition party with high election chances can simply change the policy in the secondperiod rather than objecting to it in the first-period. In other words, an electorally strong
opposition party will be more selective in terms of the issues that he brings to the voter’s
attention. The effect of β on the opposition threshold in the government-disciplining region
is particularly important if the cost of objection is high. In such cases, an electorally strong
opposition may be insufficient because it would fail to warn the voter against proposals that
would be quite harmful for the voter.
In opposition-disciplining and false alarm regions, an opposition party with high election
chances is also more selective in terms of objecting to government proposals albeit for different reasons. In the former, the opposition party will try to avoid emphasizing issues on
which his preferences are different from those of the voter. In the latter, the opposition will
resist objecting to proposals just for the sake of pleasing his activists because of the risk
of climb-down cost in case he is elected. An opposition party with small election chances
can behave irresponsibly alarming the voter for no reason without much cost. Note that in
opposition-disciplining and false alarm regions, the government is already acting in a congruent manner with the voter. In other words, the voter does not really have to be concerned
about paying attention to the policy as long as the government is in power. The tendency of
the opposition to alarm voters in these regions can be detrimental for voter’s welfare. At the
very least, the voter would be wasting his time for policies that are already in accordance
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with his preferences. Even worse, if the expected benefit of paying attention to the policy
becomes lower than the cost of attention, the informative equilibrium will not hold anymore.

Proposition 5 In the informative equilibrium, the objection threshold is non-increasing
in β.

In order to understand the implications of Proposition 5, I first consider a case where the
cost of objection is high. The first panel of figure 2.3 shows the change in opposition threshold
for a game where c = 3.5 and d = 1.2. The indifference points of the government activists, the
voter, the opposition, and the opposition activists are −1, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Hence,
the ω values between −1 and 1 constitute the government-disciplining region where the
opposition’s objection can change the government’s policy if the voter pays attention. For low
values of β the opposition objects in the whole region. As β gets larger, the opposition only
objects to proposals under the curve that would be too costly for the voter. An electorally
strong opposition has a good chance of acquiring the power to change the policy in the
second period; therefore, he will not bother to pay the cost of objection for changing a
mildly harmful policy in the first period. Whether an electorally strong opposition is better
for the voter depends on the cost of attention for him. In order to analyze the implication
of the opposition’s behavior for the voter’s welfare, we need to consider his expected benefit
from paying attention to the policy.
The immediate implication of the change in threshold is its effect on how useful the
signal is for the voter. The second panel of figure 2.3 plots the expected benefit of paying
attention to an objection for different values of β. When the opposition objects all the time,
the expected benefit of paying attention to the objection is low. As the threshold becomes
lower, this means the expected value of ω is smaller hence the voter can deduce that the
government’s liberal proposal will be costly. If the cost of paying attention for the voter is
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high enough, the voter will only take seriously the objections coming from opposition parties
with high chances of election. For other opposition parties, the informative equilibrium is
not going to hold.

Figure 2.3: The Effect of the Opposition’s Election Chances

Finally, the third panel shows the expected utility of the voter in the governmentdisciplining region assuming the equilibrium holds.12 We see that the expected utility is
smaller for higher values of β. The loss of utility results from the ω values for which an
insufficient opposition with high election chances does not warn the voter. It is important to
12

I set t = 0.3 in the figure.
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realize, however, that the utility from an opposition party with low election chances is only
higher if the voter paid attention to him in the first place. The frequency of the signal can be
an asset or liability depending on how much attention the voter is willing to pay to politics.
If the voter is content with paying attention to only issues that could result in big losses, an
opposition party with small election chances will be useless because its irresponsible behavior
may lead to the voter’s negligence of the signal altogether. Otherwise, an opposition party
with high election chances may be insufficient since it will not warn the voter in all cases
that could help voters.
Second, I consider a case where the cost of objection is low. The first panel of figure 2.4
shows the change in opposition threshold for a game with the same parameters as in the
first example except c, which equals 0.5 in this case. The opposition objects to a liberal
proposal if the state of the world falls in the region below the line. As seen in the first panel,
irrespective of the probability of election, the opposition party always objects to proposals in
the government-disciplining region. As the probability of election gets smaller, the opposition
party starts to object to proposals in the opposition-disciplining and false alarm regions as
well, which means the signal becomes less informative for the voter. More specifically, the
probability of the policy proposal in the government-disciplining region (i.e. the proposal
being harmful for the voter) given the signal decreases. Since the voter does not receive
any first-period benefit from paying attention to proposals in the opposition-disciplining and
false regions, the benefit from paying attention gets smaller as β decreases.
Assuming that the equilibrium holds, the expected utility of the voter in the governmentdisciplining region is constant. However, for small values of β the opposition may lose his
influence on the voter. Finally, we consider the changes in the expected utility of the voter
in the opposition-disciplining region. Since parties with lower chances of election are more
likely to give away themselves by opposing in this region, the voter is better able to discipline
the opposition.
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Figure 2.4: The Effect of the Opposition’s Election Chances

2.5.2

Indifference Point of Opposition Activists (AO )

The effect of the opposition activists on the objection threshold is pretty straightforward.
The opposition receives position-taking benefit from opposing to liberal policies. As the
opposition activists moves away from the voter, the opposition party will be willing to object
to proposals for a broader range of ω values.
Proposition 6 In the informative equilibrium, the objection threshold is non-decreasing
in AO .
The upper left part of figure 2.5 shows this for a game with the parameters the same
as the first example except c = 3 and β = 0.5. The effect of the opposition activists
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on the voter’s welfare is mixed. On the one hand, activists encourage the opposition to
object to policies that would be costly for the voter in cases where the opposition would
not have bothered to object otherwise. On the other hand, extreme activists may lead to
an irresponsible opposition party that does not have any influence on the voter. Assuming
that the activists are not extreme enough for the opposition party to completely lose his
influence, the expected utility of the voter increases in both the government-disciplining and
opposition-disciplining regions.
Figure 2.5: The Effect of Opposition Activists
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2.6

Conclusion

The model in this paper shows that the presence of an opposition party may improve the
voters’ welfare by warning them against incongruent policy proposals of the government.
More specifically, the confrontation between the government and the opposition party is more
likely when (i) the chances of election for the opposition party are low, and (ii) opposition
activists are ideologically distant from the government (as well as the voter and the opposition
party). Voters can use the objections of the opposition party as signals to identify the
government’s proposals that do not align with their interests. However, for the mechanism
to work, the opposition party should be responsible, i.e. not alarm the voters too frequently.
In the presence of a responsible opposition party, voter’s welfare also increases because the
government will have to preemptively adjust its policies.
The model helps us reevaluate the role of legislative opposition in policymaking in two
ways. First, the position of opposition parties as contenders for political power places them
in a unique position that is different from other political actors in democratic systems such as
interest groups or media. The possibility that the opposition party may be held accountable
for its objections (if it comes to power) dampens its tendencies to act irresponsibly. Second,
opposition party’s incentives to respond to party activists may be helpful for constituents
since it motivates the party to put the effort to object to incongruent policy proposals. If
the activists are too extreme, however, this may lead to irresponsible behavior on the part
of the opposition.
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Chapter 3
What is Opposition Good For?

“The pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of
the whole people by the whole people, equally represented. Democracy, as commonly conceived and hitherto practiced, is the government of the whole people
by a mere majority of the people exclusively represented. The former is synonymous with the equality of all citizens; the latter, strangely confounded with it, is
a government of privilege in favor of the numerical majority, who alone possess
practically any voice in the state.” (J.S. Mill, 1862)
“The opposition has the responsibility of providing criticism and posing useful alternatives to government policies. This function, properly performed, helps
government to set goals best qualified to produce public satisfaction. On matters of budget, welfare and other major concerns, criticism keeps the government
responsive to the public and aware of weaknesses in its program.” (Apter 1962)

3.1

Introduction

Democratically elected governments may propose policies that are incongruent with the
median voter’s preferences. When the voters do not pay attention to politics, the government
may get away with implementing these policies. An opposition party may help solve the
problem of incongruence by warning the voters against incongruent policy proposals. The
previous chapter shows that an opposition party’s message would be credible only when the
opposition party has sufficient chance of being elected and its activists are not extreme. In
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this chapter, I introduce additional problems that the voters face. First, the voters may
not always have the means to verify the information that they receive from the opposition.
Second, the voters may have limited information about the preferences of the government
and the opposition party, which makes it harder to keep the government responsive.
When the voters do not have the means to verify information about policy alternatives,
the opposition may mislead the voters. The opposition may do this for policy or electoral
purposes. If the opposition has information that would make it more difficult to justify
its preferred policy, it may prefer to misinform voters in order to facilitate the adoption
of its preferred policy. Similarly, if the opposition has information that would support the
preferred policy of the government, it would not be willing to admit that the government is
implementing the policy that is good for the public. Instead, it would be inclined to sabotage
the reelection chances of the government. With these motivational obstacles in mind, this
paper asks whether the opposition can contribute to the responsiveness of the political system
through its participation in parliamentary debates. More specifically, this question can be
divided into two parts: (1) Under which conditions do opposition parties provide voters with
useful information about the consequences of policies? (2) Do government parties have to
adjust their policy decisions in accordance with the newly available information?
In order to answer these questions, I propose a formal model that explores the effect
of the opposition party on policy decisions in an environment where voters have limited
information about the consequences of policies and about the policy bias of politicians. The
model tackles two types of informational asymmetry between voters and politicians. First,
there is a discrepancy in policy expertise, which makes it difficult for voters to discipline
politicians. Second, politicians may be biased in favor of certain policies irrespective of the
consequences for voters. The model compares policy decisions that occur with and without
parliamentary debate.
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The following example illustrates the motivation for this paper. An investment decision
has to be made in a parliamentary system with two parties: a majority and a minority.
The majority party in the parliament forms the government, so they have control over both
the legislature and the executive. The majority party has an agenda that emphasizes economic development whereas the minority party has an agenda that emphasizes environmental
protection. Hence the majority party is likely to discount the environmental costs of an investment, whereas the minority party is likely to discount economic benefits. The reason for
this bias may be due to ideological concerns or the influence of interest groups. The voters
have a more balanced view: they want the investment as long as the environmental costs are
not too heavy; however, they have incomplete information about the costs of the investment.
Given the institutional setup and high party discipline, the majority party seems to have
all the power. The minority party cannot change the outcome by voting. In this chapter,
I explore the conditions under which (1) the minority party provides truthful information
about the cost of investment to voters and (2) this information has an effect on the policy
outcome.
Using a principal agent model, I show that the opposition party can discipline the government to choose policies congruent with voters’ preferences if the reputation of the opposition
is high, and the benefit of policy to the government is small relative to the benefit of winning
elections. Under the same conditions, however, misleading messages of the opposition party
may cause a good government to implement policies that bring about bad outcomes for the
voters.

3.2

Literature

Information transmission in debates has been the topic of several formal theoretical models.
We can divide these models into two categories: signaling models and principal agent models.
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Signaling models assume multiple legislators with different policy preferences, who need to
make a decision in an imperfect information environment (Austen-Smith 1990, Dellis 2007,
Stasavage 2007). The players in these models have equal voting weight. In addition, they can
influence others’ decisions through changing their beliefs about the consequences of policies.
My motivating question is different in two respects. First, political actors in the model do
not have equal decision-making power: the majority party makes the policy decision in the
first period while the minority party can only announce its position. Second, I introduce
voters into the model, which is critical because the minority party is expected to influence
the decision of the majority party by changing the beliefs of voters about the consequences
of policies.
The second category of models that would be helpful in answering my question are agency
models with asymmetric information. In these models, the principals face informational constraints that bring about two types of problems. First, the principal has limited information
about agents; therefore, she faces the problem of choosing the agent that would make decisions in accordance with principal’s preferences. Second, the principal lacks the policy
expertise that the agent has; therefore, she faces the problem of monitoring the behavior of
the agent. Depending on the action of the agent in the first period, the principal decides
whether to retain the agent or replace him with a opposition. In what follows, I’ll review
models in which voters are the principals and politicians are the agents.1
The opposition in many of the principal-agent models is rather passive. It does not take
any action that may affect its election chances. Hence, the only information source for the
principal is the government. (Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts 2001, Prat 2005, Schults
2008). In some models, there is a third party, such as a newspaper or an auditor, that gives
1

There are other agency models in which politicians are the agents. See Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987 for a
game between the floor and the committee; Grossman and Helpman 2001 for a game between politicians and
special interest groups; Morris 2001 for a game between politicians and advisors; Huber and Shipan 2002 for
a game between politicians and bureaucrats.
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information about the government and the opposition (Ashworth and Shotts 2010, Warren
2012). The obvious difference in this setup is that the third party does not compete with
the government. Finally, there are models in which the opposition makes an announcement
about his policy preference before the elections (Lemon 2005, Ashworth and Shotts 2015,
Dewan and Hortala-Valve 2013). My model falls into this final category; however, it differs
from these studies with respect to the type of agents.
As discussed above, principals (voters) have limited information about agents (politicians), who come in different types. One characteristic that distinguishes politicians from
one another relates to the quality of information that they have about the mapping between
policies and consequences (Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts 2001, Prat 2005, Ashworth and
Shotts 2010, Ashworth and Shotts 2015).2 Another characteristic that distinguishes politicians is the level of competence in implementing policies (Dewan and Hortala-Valve 2013).
Finally, politicians may differ in terms of whether they are biased in favor of a certain policy
irrespective of its consequences (Lemon 2005).
The study that comes closest to answering the question asked in this paper is Lemon
(2005); therefore, it would be worth discussing his model in detail. In Lemon’s model, the
government chooses a policy from two alternatives. One of these policies is the correct policy
that will bring about positive outcome for the voter while the other policy will bring about
negative outcome. The government knows which policy is the correct policy whereas the
voter only knows that both policies are equally likely to be correct. After the policy decision
is made, the voter makes a decision about whether to replace the government with the
opposition. The opposition has the same information about the policy that the government
does. The opposition does not have a say in the policy decision; however, he can make a
policy recommendation to the public. There are three versions of the model with different
2
In Ashworth and Shotts 2015, politicians may differ in terms of information; however, they decide on
the level of effort they will put into acquiring information. Hence, the situation in their model is different
from other models in which the type of the politician is determined by the nature.
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timing of the policy recommendation. I am interested in the version where the opposition
is the agenda setter, that is, where the opposition makes the policy recommendation before
the government’s policy decision.
The politicians (the government and the opposition) in the model benefit from both
policy and office. They differ in terms of their policy preferences. Bad politicians always
benefit from the wrong policy whereas good politicians always benefit from the correct policy.
The voter does not know the types of politicians; however, each politician has some public
reputation. The voter wants to elect good politicians. After having observed the policy
decision, the voter reconsiders the reputation of the two politicians. The voter’s decision
in the elections is not completely determined by the reputation of the politicians after this
particular policy decision. That is, the voter does not always reelect the government if she
believes the government is more likely to be good than the opposition. A higher reputation
increases the chances of reelection for the government but does not guarantee reelection.
Similarly a higher reputation increases the chances of election for the opposition but does
not guarantee election. The reason for this probabilistic decision is because the voter also
cares about other issues but the politician does not know the voter’s preferences on these
issues.
Based on this model, Lemon identifies several equilibria where the opposition’s policy
recommendation is informative, that is, the policy recommendation gives some information
about the correct policy. He divides these equilibria into three categories: (i) If the opposition’s recommendation gives information about the type of the government, the equilibrium
is politician revealing. (ii) If the opposition’s recommendation motivates the bad government
to choose correct policy more frequently than he would have done otherwise, the equilibrium
is bad-government disciplining. (iii) If the opposition’s recommendation motivates the good
government to choose wrong policy more frequently than he would have done otherwise, the
equilibrium is good-government disciplining.
39

Lemon’s work provides a good starting point to answer questions related to the role of
opposition in policy making; however, the model does not capture the types of issues that are
the most pertinent to political debate. The most obvious example to the type of problem
captured in Lemon’s model would be when corrupt politicians extract resources for their
own consumption. Many policy issues as illustrated by the example in the previous section
differ from this problem in important respects. First, depending on the circumstances,
biased politicians’ preferences may not be in conflict with the interests of the voters. The
government party may prefer to make an investment because it is biased in favor of economic
development yet in some cases making an investment is actually beneficial for the voters.
Second, politicians differ from each other in terms of their policy preferences. The policy
biases of the government and the opposition parties are usually in different directions. In my
example, the bad government party always wants to make the investment whereas the bad
opposition party always opposes the investment. Finally, voters know the preferred policies
of biased parties, which makes it easier for the voters to identify biased parties. Going back
to my example, the voter knows that a biased government party will never choose not to
make the investment except for reelection purposes. The model in this chapter explained in
the next section incorporates these aspects of the parties’ preferences. For the rest of the
paper, I’ll assume that political parties are unitary actors. I’ll refer to the majority party as
the government and the minority party as the opposition.

3.3

Model

There are three players in the model: a government (G), an opposition (O) and a representative voter (V). In the baseline model, the opposition has no role. In the deliberative
model, the opposition sends a costless message m ∈ {0, 1} about his preferred policy. In
both models, the government chooses a policy x ∈ {0, 1}. The outcome of the policy de-
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pends on whether the policy matches the state of the world ω ∈ {0, 1}. The state of the
world is observed by the government and the opposition but not by the voter. The voter
only knows that both states of the world are equally likely to occur. The preferred policies
of the government and the opposition depend on their respective types. The government
and the opposition can be one of two types t ∈ {b, g}. The bad government always prefers
x = 1 whereas the bad opposition always prefers x = 0. The good government (or opposition) prefers the policy that matches the state of the world. The type of the government is
private information. The opposition and the voter only know that the probability that the
government is good is βG . The same is true for the opposition’s type. The prior belief that
the opposition is good is βO .
Timing of the game in the baseline model is the following:
1. Nature chooses the government’s type, the opposition’s type and the state of the world.
2. The government and the opposition observe the state of the world.
3. The government chooses a policy x ∈ {0, 1}.
4. The voter decides whether to reelect the government or not.
Timing of the game in the deliberative model is the following:3
1. Nature chooses the government’s type, the opposition’s type and the state of the world.
2. The government and the opposition observe the state of the world.
3. The opposition announces his preferred policy m ∈ {0, 1}.
3

The timing of this model is a good approximation of the real world where debate precedes the policy
decision. One can argue that the government also participates in political debate before making its policy
decision. If the government does not pay any cost for implementing a policy that is different from what it
advocated during debate, the message of the government would not provide any information. The voters
would take into account the policy decision rather than the message. A model where the government pays
a cost for reversal is left for future research.
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4. The government chooses a policy x ∈ {0, 1}.
5. The voter decides whether to reelect the government or not.
The utility functions of players are the same for both games.
The politicians’ utility has two components. First, they receive non-negative utility from
the policy depending on their types. The good politicians receive utility bg > 0 from policy
that matches the state of the world. The bad politicians receive utility bb > 0 from their
preferred policies. Second, politicians receive utility of 1 from winning elections.
Utility functions of the two types of governments are the following:

uGg (x, m, ω) =

uGB (x, m) =

bg + Pr(reelect|x, m) if x = ω
0 + Pr(reelect|x, m) if x 6= ω

0 + Pr(reelect|x, m) if x = 0
bb + Pr(reelect|x, m) if x = 1

Similarly, utility functions of the two types of oppositions are the following:

uOg (x, m, ω) =

uOb (x, m) =

bg + 1 − Pr(reelect|x, m) if x = ω
0 + 1 − Pr(reelect|x, m) if x 6= ω

bb + 1 − Pr(reelect|x, m) if x = 0
0 + 1 − Pr(reelect|x, m) if x = 1

The voter receives positive utility from electing good politicians. After having observed
the opposition’s message m and the government’s policy x, the voter updates her beliefs about
the types of the government and the opposition. The updated beliefs of the voter about
c
the government and the opposition are indicated by βc
G (m, x) and βO (m, x), respectively.
For ease of notation, I indicate the arguments of the updated beliefs by superscripts. For
0
example, in the baseline model βc
G refers to the updated belief about the government after
01
observing policy x = 0. In the model with debate, βc
refers to the updated belief about
G
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the government after observing message m = 0 and policy x = 1. The voter reelects
the government according to her updated beliefs; however, her decision is not completely
determined by her beliefs. The voter’s decision is probabilistic: she reelects the government
c
with probability H(βc
G , βO ), where H is a cumulative distribution function increasing in the
first term and decreasing in the second term. An example for H would be H =

c
1+βc
G −βO
.
2

Hence, when the voter’s updated beliefs about both politicians are the same, the voter flips
a coin. When, the voter believes that the government is more likely to be good than the
opposition, she will reelect the government with p > 1/2; however, p will never be 1 unless
c
βc
G = 1 and βO = 0.
The solution concept for the game is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. When beliefs are
not pinned down by Bayes’ rule, I calculate the beliefs assuming that both the opposition
and the government are purely policy-oriented. The next section shows the equilibria in the
baseline model where the opposition does not take any action.

3.4

Baseline Model

In the absence of political debate, the voter does not acquire any information about the
position of the opposition party. The only information she gets is the policy decision of
the government, which may give clues about whether the government is good or not. The
voter does not know the type of the government or the state of the world; however, she
knows that the bad government prefers policy x = 1 irrespective the state of the world.
Hence, the bad government has incentive to choose policy x = 0 only if this increases its
reelection chances. The probability that the voter will reelect the government is determined
by her belief that the government is good. In perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the beliefs of
the players should be consistent with the strategies of other players. Hence, in any perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, the probability that the voter reelects the government after observing
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x = 0 should be (weakly) greater than the probability that she reelects the government after
observing x = 1.4 If we go back to our example, the voter would reelect the government
with (weakly) higher probability when the investment is not made.
In order to find the equilibria in the baseline model, we need to think about the incentives
of the government given the reelection decision of the voter. The good government’s decision
is pretty straightforward when ω = 0 . It will choose policy x = 0 since doing so will benefit it
on both policy and reelection grounds. When ω = 1, however, the good government’s policy
and reelection incentives contradict each other. Choosing x = 1 will bring the government
policy benefits; however, it will decrease its reelection chances. A similar trade-off is the
case for the bad government irrespective of ω. Hence, the equilibrium strategy of the good
government when ω = 1, and of the bad government will depend on how much they value
policy relative to winning elections. If the electoral benefit of choosing policy x = 0 is higher
than the policy benefit of choosing x = 1, the government will give up its preferred policy of
x = 1. Following this logic, Proposition 1 shows all the equilibria in pure strategies for the
baseline model.
Proposition 1: In the baseline model, the following equilibria exist in pure strategies:
(a)Both types of governments always choose their preferred policies, provided:
4

To see why this is the case, let us assume that this statement is not true, i.e., the voter reelects the
government with higher probability after observing x = 1. Then, the bad government will never choose
policy x = 0 while the good government may choose x = 0 depending on the value it assigns to policy
relative to winning elections. If the good government does not value reelection a lot, it will choose x = 0
when ω = 0. Hence, the voter will know that she is facing a good government whenever she observes policy
x = 0. Therefore, she should reelect the government with higher probability after observing x = 0. If the
good government values reelection enough to choose x = 1 when ω = 0, the voter will never observe x = 0.
Hence, the beliefs are not pinned down by Bayes’ rule. In this case, I calculate beliefs assuming that both
parties are policy-oriented. Given this assumption, the voter should reelect the government with higher
probability after observing x = 0, as well.
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1

H(1, βO ) − H(βc
G , βO ) ≤ bb

(for bg ≥ bb )

1
H(1, βO ) − H(βc
G , βO ) ≤ bg

(for bg ≤ bb )

(3.1)

where
1
βc
G =

βG /2
1 − βG /2

(b) The good government chooses x = 0 and the bad government chooses x = 1 irrespective of the state of the world, provided:

bg ≤ H(1, βO ) − H(0, βO ) ≤ bb

(3.2)

(c) The good government always chooses x = 0 irrespective of the state of the world,
and the bad government chooses the policy that matches the state of the world,5 provided:

bg ≤ bb

(3.3)

H(βc
G , βO ) − H(0, βO ) = bb

(3.4)

0

where
0
2βG
βc
G =
βG + 1
5

There is also an equilibrium in which the bad government chooses the policy that does not match the
state of the world. That is, the bad government will choose x = 1 when ω = 0 and x = 0 when ω = 1. For
the purposes of this paper, this equilibrium is not particularly interesting.

45

(d) Both types of governments choose x = 0 irrespective of the state of the world,
provided:
1

H(βG , βO ) − H(βc
G , βO ) ≥ bg

(for bg ≥ bb )

1
H(βG , βO ) − H(βc
G , βO ) ≥ bb

(for bg ≤ bb )

(3.5)

βG /2
1 − βG /2
When the electoral benefit of choosing x = 0 is smaller than the benefit that both

where

1
βc
G =

the good and the bad governments receive from their preferred policies, electoral incentives
cannot convince the governments to give up their preferred policy of x = 1. Therefore,
there is an equilibrium where both types of governments choose their preferred policy in
equilibrium when the conditions shown in Proposition 1(a) are satisfied. To see how this
works, let us assume that both types of governments choose their preferred policy. When
the voter observes policy x = 0, she knows for sure that the government is good. When she
observes policy x = 1, her updated belief that the government is good will be smaller than
the initial reputation of the government. Therefore, choosing x = 1 will be costly for the
government. Since the benefit that both good and bad governments get from their preferred
policy is greater than the electoral benefit of choosing x = 0, both types of governments will
choose their preferred policies. Figure 3.1 shows the parameters for which this equilibrium
holds when the voter’s decision function is H =

1+βG −βO 6
2

. When the initial reputation of the

government is high, the voter’s updated belief that the government is good remains high.
Therefore, the electoral cost that the government incurs for choosing its preferred policy
is relatively small. This means that the government will continue to choose its preferred
policy even if it assigns relatively small values to policy. As the initial reputation of the
government decreases, however, the electoral cost of choosing policy x = 1 will be higher,
6

For bg < bb , the y axis should be replaced by policy benefit for good player(bg ).
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hence the governments whose preferred policy is x = 1 will only choose their preferred policy
if the value that they assign to policy is high enough.
1 + βG − βO
2
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Figure 3.1: Proposition 1(a) for bg > bb and H =
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If the good government values policy less than the bad government, we may encounter a
situation where the electoral benefit of choosing x = 0 is greater than the amount the good
government values policy but smaller than the amount the bad government values policy. In
this case, the good and bad governments will choose policies x = 0 and x = 1, respectively,
irrespective of the state of the world. After observing the policy x = 0, the voter will know
for sure that the government is good, and reelect the government with higher probability
than she would do after observing policy x = 1. The condition for this equilibrium is given
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in Proposition 1(b).7 When the voter’s decision function is H =

1+βG −βO
,
2

this condition

requires that bg be smaller than 1/2 and bb be greater than 1/2.
When the electoral benefit of choosing x = 0 is greater than the amount the good
government values policy but exactly equal to the amount the bad government values policy,
the good government will always choose x = 0. The bad government will be indifferent
between choosing x = 0 and x = 1 in both states of the world. Given the type of problem
discussed in this chapter, I will ignore the case where the government chooses the policy that
does not match the state of the world. This would be the case where the government party
decides to make the investment when it is not beneficial for the voters but not to make the
investment when it is beneficial for the voters. It would make more sense to think, however,
that the government would be more in favor of the investment when it is beneficial for the
voters. When we look at the case where the bad government chooses the policy that matches
the state of the world, we see that the voter will find out that the government is bad upon
observing policy x = 1. When x = 0, however, the voter’s belief that the government is good
will go up. If the knife-edge condition stated in Proposition 1(c) is satisfied, we can have
the equilibrium where the bad government always chooses the correct policy.
Finally, the electoral benefit of choosing x = 0 may be grater than the policy benefit of
x = 1 for both good and bad governments. In that case, both governments will choose policy
x = 0 irrespective of the state of the world. The condition for this equilibrium to hold is
given in Proposition 1(d). Since both types of governments always choose policy x = 0, the
7

When the electoral benefit of choosing x = 0 is greater than the amount the bad government values
policy but smaller than the amount the good government values policy, there is no equilibrium. In this
case, the bad government will always choose policy x = 0. The good government will choose the policy
that matches the state of the world. When the voter observes policy x = 1, she will know for sure that the
government is good. When she observes policy x = 0, she will know that she is facing one if the following
two situations: 1)The government is good, and choses policy x = 0 because ω = 0. 2) The government
is bad, and choses policy x = 1 for fear of electoral cost. Hence, the updated beliefs of the voter upon
observing policy x = 1 will be lower than the initial reputation of the government. This will no longer be
an equilibrium because the voter will have incentive to reelect the government with higher probability after
observing policy x = 1.
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voter does not obtain any information about the government’s type by observing the policy
x = 0. Hence, the reputation of the government stays the same after policy x = 0. Since
x = 1 is never chosen in equilibrium, the voter’s belief is not pinned down by Bayes’ rule.
If the voter assumes that deviation from equilibrium is caused by a purely policy-oriented
government, her updated belief will be lower than the government’s initial reputation. If the
difference between the two values is greater than the value that both types of governments
assign to policy, it will be worth for the government to give up its preferred policy. As
shown in Figure 3.2, the parameters for which this equilibrium holds are quite limited for
the decision function H =

1+βG −βO 8
.
2

It is important to note that in the baseline model there are no equilibria where both
types of governments choose the correct policy. If there were such an equilibrium, the voter
would not acquire any information about the government. Hence, the voter would reelect
8

For bg < bb , the y axis should be replaced by policy benefit for bad player(bb ).
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the government with equal probability after observing x = 0 and x = 1. When the bad
government does not have any electoral incentive to choose the correct policy, it would
deviate to its preferred policy of x = 1 irrespective of the state of the world. In all the
equilibria described in Proposition 1, there is welfare loss for the voter. The next section
identifies equilibria in the model with debate to see whether introduction of political debate
can improve the welfare of the voter.

3.5

Model with Debate

The previous section shows that there are no equilibria in the baseline model where both
governments choose the policy that matches the state of the world. In a world with no
debate, the voter’s lack of information limits her ability to discipline the government to make
decisions in accordance with her interests. The focus of this paper is to explore whether this
situation may be improved when the opposition party gives the voter information about the
state of the world. More specifically, I look into the existence of bad government-disciplining
equilibria, that is, equilibria where the opposition’s message motivates the bad government
to choose the correct policy in a situation where it would not have done so if the message
had been different. It is important to note that disciplining the bad government becomes an
issue only when ω = 0. When ω = 1, the policy preferences of the government are already
aligned with those of the voter. Hence, in this section, I am looking at situations where the
opposition’s message m = 0 induces the bad government to choose policy x = 0 for electoral
concerns.
First, I consider the possibility of bad government-disciplining equilibria where the opposition is always truthful. In such an equilibrium, both types of opposition announce the
policy that matches the state of the world. In addition, when ω = 0 the bad government
chooses policy x = 0 with some positive probability after m = 0, and policy x = 1 after
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m = 1. In other words, the bad government’s electoral incentives outweigh its policy incentives only when the opposition announces the policy that matches the state of the world,
hence the disciplining effect of the debate. Proposition 2 states that there exist no equilibria
that satisfy these conditions when bg 6= bb .9
Proposition 2: If bg 6= bb , there are no bad government-disciplining equilibria where
the opposition is always truthful. That is, there are no equilibria where (i) both types of
opposition always announce the policy that matches the state of the world, and (ii) when
ω = 0, the bad government chooses policy x = 0 with positive probability after m = 0, and
policy x = 1 after m = 1.
For a bad government-disciplining equilibrium with truthful opposition to exist, the opposition should have incentives to announce the correct policy. At the very least, announcing
the correct policy should not hurt the opposition. Given that the bad opposition’s preferred
policy is not always the correct policy, it will have stronger incentives to deviate from such
an equilibrium. In particular, admitting that ω = 1 may be costly for the bad opposition
because it makes it less costly for the government to choose policy x = 1. If announcing
m = 1 induces the government to choose x = 1 instead of x = 0 without incurring any
reputation costs, then the bad opposition would deviate from the truthful equilibrium in
order not to lose his preferred policy. If the announcement m = 1 does not change the policy
choice of the government but increases its reelection chances, then the opposition would
also deviate from the truthful equilibrium.10 There are cases where the bad opposition does
not have incentive to deviate from the truthful equilibrium. If the good government cares
enough about reelection to choose policy x = 0 when ω = 1 irrespective of the opposition’s
announcement, the announcement m = 1 does not help the reelection of government. In
9
10

See Appendix for the proof of Proposition 2.
See all the cases where bg > bb , and the cases (i-a) and (iii-a) wherebg < bb in the proof of Proposition 2.
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these cases, the good opposition will incur a cost for revealing the correct state of the world,
and hence will have incentive to deviate from the truthful equilibrium.11
Second, I consider the possibility of bad government-disciplining equilibria where only
the good opposition is truthful. In particular, let us think of a situation where the good
opposition always announces the policy that matches the state of the world, and the bad
opposition announces m = 0 irrespective of the state of the world. Given the incentives
of the bad opposition to mislead the voters, this situation is plausible. The question then
becomes whether such behavior of the opposition would have a disciplining effect on the bad
government’s policy decision. That is, whether we can find an equilibrium where the bad
government chooses the correct policy when ω = 0 only when the bad opposition announces
m = 0. Proposition 3 identifies such an equilibrium and specifies the conditions for its
existence.
Proposition 3: In the model with debate, there exists an equilibrium where (i) the
good opposition always makes the announcement that matches the state of the world, (ii)
the bad opposition always announces m = 0, (iii) both types of governments choose policy
x = 0 when m = 0, (iv) the good government chooses the policy that matches the state of
the world when m = 1, and (v) the bad government chooses policy x = 1 when m = 1. This
equilibrium exists, provided:
00
c 01 c 01
H(βG , βc
O ) − H(βG , βO ) ≥ bg

(for bg ≥ bb )

00
c 01 c 01
H(βG , βc
O ) − H(βG , βO ) ≥ bb

(for bg ≤ bb )

00

H(βG , βc
O ) − H(βG , 1) ≤ bb (1 − βG ) (for bg ≥ bb )
00
H(βG , βc
O ) − H(βG , 1) ≤ bg (1 − βG ) (for bg ≤ bb )

where
11

See cases (i-c-i),(i-c-iii),(iii-c-1) and (iii-c-iii) in the proof of Proposition 2.
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(3.6)

(3.7)

00
01
βc
= βc
=
O
O

01
βO
1 − βO
and βc
= βG ·
G
2 − βO
2 − βO

In this equilibrium, both types of opposition always follow the message m = 0 whereas
they continue to choose their preferred policy when m = 1. Notice that message m = 1 is
announced only by the good opposition when ω = 1. Since the preferred policies of both types
of governments are the same when ω = 1, the behavior of good and bad governments are
identical on the equilibrium path. Hence, on the equilibrium path, the voter only observes
the message-policy pairs (0, 0) and (1, 1). In either case, the voter does not receive any
information about the type of the government. In the former case, the voter updates her
belief about the opposition to

βO
,
2−βO

which is smaller than the initial reputation of the

opposition. In the latter case, the voter knows for sure that the opposition is good. The
beliefs of the voter are not pinned down by the Bayes’ rule for the message-policy pairs
(0, 1) and (1, 0). I calculate the beliefs of the voter assuming that both the opposition
and the government are policy-oriented. The updated beliefs about the opposition and the
government after the pair (0, 1) are both lower than their respective initial reputation.12 The
updated beliefs after the pair (1, 0) are the same as those after (1, 1).13
12

Holding the government’s strategy constant, the opposition does not have any incentive to deviate from
m = 1. Remember that m = 1 is observed only when ω = 1 and the opposition is good. In this case,
deviating to m = 0 would result in the government’s choosing policy x = 1, which is not the preferred
policy of the good opposition. Therefore, when the voter observes (0, 1), she assumes that the opposition did
βO
not deviate. Hence, the updated belief about the opposition stays 2−β
. Given the opposition’s strategy,
O
1
when the message m = 0 is observed, the voter knows that ω = 0 with probability 2−β
, and ω = 1 with
O
O
probability 1−β
2−βO . When ω = 0, the good government does not have any incentive to deviate to x = 1. When
ω = 1, both types of governments have incentive to deviate to x = 1. Hence, the voter’s belief about the
1−βO
government after (0, 1) equals βG · 2−β
.
O

13

Holding the government’s strategy constant, the opposition does not have any incentive to deviate from
m = 0. The good opposition announces m = 0 only when ω = 0. If he deviates to m = 1, this will result
in bad government choosing x = 0, which is against the policy interests of the good opposition. The bad
opposition always announces m = 0. If he deviates to m = 1, either only the bad government (when ω = 1)
or both types of governments (when ω = 0) choosing x = 0, which is also against the policy interests of the
bad opposition. Hence, after observing the pair (1, 0), the voter concludes that the government is good after
observing and ω = 1. In this case, neither type of government has reason to deviate to x = 0. Therefore,
the voter’s belief about the government equals the government’s initial reputation.
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Having calculated the voter’s beliefs about the opposition and the government, I can
now check whether their strategies are consistent with the incentives. First, I consider the
incentives of the government after observing m = 0. For both types of governments to choose
x = 0 after m = 0, the benefit that they get from their preferred policy should be sufficiently
low. The left hand side of the inequality in condition (1) of the Proposition 3 gives the
difference in the probability of reelection between when the government chooses x = 0 and
x = 1 after observing m = 0. Even though the bad opposition’s message can be misleading
information in this equilibrium, the message m = 0 gives some information to the voter
about the state of the world. Based on this information, the voter updates her belief about
the government in a way that would hurt government’s reputation when x = 1 is chosen after
m = 0.14 If the increase in the reelection chances of the government acquired by choosing
x = 0 instead of x = 1 is greater than benefit that both types of governments get from their
preferred policy, then both types of governments will follow the message m = 0 irrespective
of the state of the world. Second, I consider the incentives of the government after observing
m = 1. As explained in the previous paragraph, the voter’s belief about the government is
the same after policy pairs (1, 0) and (1, 1), which means that the government’s reelection
probability does not depend on his policy choice after m = 1. In this case, both types of
governments choose their preferred policy after the message m = 1.
Given the beliefs of the voter and the strategy of the government, I now check the
incentives of the opposition. First, I consider the incentives of the opposition when ω = 0.
Note that both types of opposition prefer the policy x = 0 in this case. When they announce
m = 0, they get their preferred policy because both types of governments always follow the
message. The downside of announcing m = 0 for the opposition is the reputation damage.
When they announce m = 1, they get their preferred policy only when they are facing
14
As explained in the previous footnotes, the voter’s belief about the government after the pair (0, 1) is
1−βO
the government initial reputation multiplied by the probability that ω = 1, which is given by 2−β
O
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a good government because the bad government would take advantage of the situation to
choose x = 1. They will, however, enjoy a reputation advantage no matter what policy
the government chooses. The voter will always think that the opposition is good after
observing the message m = 1. Hence, the question becomes whether the policy advantage of
announcing m = 0 is big enough to cancel out the electoral advantage of announcing m = 1.
The left hand side of the inequality in condition (2) of Proposition 3 gives the electoral loss as
a result of announcing m = 0.15 The right hand side of the inequality shows the policy gain
from announcing m = 0. If the electoral loss is smaller, then the opposition will announce
m = 0.
Second, I consider the incentives of the opposition when ω = 1. In particular, I check
whether the good opposition announces m = 1, and the bad opposition announces m = 0
in this case. As discussed above, announcing m = 1 when ω = 1 results in both types of
governments choosing policy x = 1. Given the policy pair (1, 1), the voter believes that the
opposition is good. Hence, announcing m = 0, which would be followed by the policy x = 0
hurts the reputation of the opposition. The good opposition does not have any reason to go
through this damage because deviating to m = 0 would lead both types of government to
switch to policy x = 0, which would result in the loss of the positive utility that the good
opposition receives from policy x = 1. The bad opposition, however, announces m = 0 when
the policy benefit that it gets is greater than the electoral loss. This condition is a weaker
condition than the condition (2) of Proposition 3.
Bringing the two conditions of Proposition 3 together, it is important to note that the
equilibrium requires that the opposition’s reputation be sufficiently high and that the utility
that the government receives from policy be sufficiently low. Figure 3.3 shows the range of βO
15
Note that the function H gives the probability of reelection for the government. Since the function is
decreasing in the second term, the difference in the left hand side of the equation will always be positive,
which points to an increase in the reelection probability of the government and hence a decrease in the
election probability of the opposition.
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(opposition’s reputation) values for which the equilibrium holds when the voter’s decisionmaking function is H =

1+βG −βO
.
2

To understand why the opposition’s reputation is critical,

think about the situation where the voter knows for sure that the opposition is good. That
would mean that the voter always finds out the correct policy; therefore, the government
cannot get away with choosing its preferred policy against the interest of the voter. As
the reputation of the opposition decreases, however, the quality of the information that the
voter, and the disciplining effect of that information deteriorates.
1 + βG − βO
2
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In addition to the quality of information, the utility from their preferred policy is critical
in determining the disciplining effect of the opposition’s message. If the benefit that the
government gets from its preferred policy is high compared to electoral benefit, it is not
possible to discipline the government. The striped area in Figure 3.4 shows the range of policy
benefit values for which the equilibrium holds when the opposition’s reputation equals 1 and
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the voter’s decision-making function is H =

1+βG −βO 16
.
2

As the government’s reputation

increases, the maximum policy benefit value for which equilibrium holds increases as well.
When the government’s reputation is 0, the government does not have anything to lose by
choosing the policy that is perceived to be bad for the voters. Hence, it may as well choose
its preferred policy and settle for the policy benefit. For governments with higher reputation,
the stakes are higher. Choosing a policy that is perceived as bad for the voters will decrease
reelection chances; therefore, the government will be willing to choose its preferred policy
only if it brings high benefit.
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To summarize, Proposition 3 shows that the inclusion of opposition in political debate
give the voters ability to discipline the government. For the disciplining effect to occur, the
opposition’s information should be credible, that is, the opposition’s reputation should be
16

As the opposition’s reputation decreases, the maximum policy benefit value for which the equilibrium
holds decreases as well.
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high enough. Moreover, the government should not care too much about policy. The next
section compares the welfare of voters under the models with and without debate.

3.6

Discussion

In a political system where the voters have limited information about the consequences of
policies, the responsiveness of government is hard to sustain. Governments that are biased
in favor of certain policies irrespective of the consequences for voters may get away with
choosing policies against the interests of the voters. When the opposition party does not
participate in the debate about policy, the situation becomes even more difficult for the
voters. The only information that the voter has is the direction of the government’s policy
bias. In the motivating example of this paper, the voters know that the government may
be biased in favor of economic development. This information leads voters to suspect the
soundness of the policy decision whenever the government makes an investment.
The policy position of the government may help the voter to discipline the government
to be more responsive to her demands; however, the disciplining effect of this information is
rather limited. Table 3.1 shows the policies chosen by different types of governments in the
equilibria of the baseline model17 . In all cases the government is punished by the voter for
making the investment because the voter takes into account that the bad government would
be willing to make the investment even when it is bad for the voters. The equilibrium may
be different depending on the severity of this punishment.
If the punishment is not severe enough for the governments to forego their preferred
policies as in Proposition 1(a), both types of governments continue to choose their preferred
policies. Hence, the voter loses when she faces a bad government under circumstances
17

The policy that is good (bad) for the voter is denoted in blue (red).
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Table 3.1: Proposition 1
ω=0
Good
x=0
Proposition 1(a) Government
Bad
x=1
Government
Good
x=0
Proposition 1(b) Government
Bad
x=1
Government
Good
x=0
Proposition 1(c) Government
Bad
x=0
Government
Good
x=0
Proposition 1(d) Government
Bad
x=0
Government

ω=1
x=1
x=1
x=0
x=1
x=0
x=1
x=0
x=0

where the environmental costs of investment are very high. If the punishment is severe
enough for both governments to forego their preferred policies as in Proposition 1(d), neither
type of government ever chooses to make the investment. Ironically, when the voter is
able to discipline the government, her welfare loss is even greater. Since governments are
too concerned about reelection to make the investment, the voter never gets the benefit of
investment. In cases (b) and (c), the punishment is severe enough to discipline the good
government but not the bad government. In these cases, the voter’s loss results from the
good government never making the investment. In case (b), the voter faces an additional
cost since the bad government makes investment that are too costly for the environment.
An opposition party giving truthful information to voters would greatly help the voters
to discipline the government. If the voter knows the environmental costs of an investment,
she can punish the government for making the investment when it is too costly. The problem
arises, however, because the opposition party has incentives to give misleading information.
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When the investment is beneficial, announcing the true state of the world would make it
less costly for the government to make the investment. When the voter learns that the
investment is beneficial, the government will not suffer reputation costs for making the
investment. Hence, by announcing the correct policy, the opposition increases the reputation
of the government, thereby decreasing his chances for holding office. Moreover, it encourages
the government to choose a policy that the bad opposition does not benefit from.
Because of the incentives of the opposition, there are no bad government-disciplining
equilibria that are always truthful. There is, however, a bad government-disciplining equilibrium where only the good opposition is truthful. In this equilibrium, the government
never makes the investment unless it is supported by the opposition. When the opposition
supports the investment, the good government makes the investment provided that it is not
too costly while the bad government always makes the investment. Table 3.2 shows the
decisions of both parties on the equilibrium path in this equilibrium. The involvement of
opposition in decision making in this equilibrium solves the problem of investment decisions
that are too costly for the environment. If the voter faces a bad opposition, however, both
types of governments follow its advice and refrain from making the investment even when
it is beneficial for the voters. For the partially truthful bad government-disciplining equilibrium to hold, there are two important conditions. First, the government should care enough
about winning the elections to give up their preferred policies. Second, the opposition’s
reputation should be high enough for the information to be credible.
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Table 3.2: Proposition 3 - Equilibrium Path
ω=0
ω=1
Good
Bad
Good
Bad
Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition
Good
m=0
m=0
m=1
m=0
Government
x=0
x=0
x=1
x=0
Bad
m=0
m=0
m=1
m=0
Government
x=0
x=0
x=1
x=0

3.7

Conclusion

The goal of this chapter is to explore whether the participation of opposition parties in
parliamentary debate has influence on policy decisions. The premise of my argument is that
the representative voter cares about the consequences of policies but that she has limited
information on the mapping between the policy alternatives and their consequences. In
contrast, political parties have better information yet some political parties may be biased
in favor of certain policies irrespective of their consequences. Given this information and
preference structure, the responsiveness of the political system is at stake. The inclusion
of an opposition party in political debate may improve responsiveness in the following way:
The opposition party may provide information to voters about the consequence of policies
that the government is going to implement. If this information is credible enough to change
the voters’ policy preference, the government may need to adjust their policy decisions
accordingly.
The credibility of the opposition’s message depends on the voters’ belief about whether
the opposition is congruent or not. If the reputation of the opposition is high enough, the
government will be obliged to follow its recommendation. This is consistent with the finding
in the second chapter that the voters take the opposition’s message seriously only when the
opposition activists are moderate. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the
two models. The model in the second chapter assumes that the opposition’s intervention
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is costly. In that situation, the incongruence of the opposition (or the opposition activists)
may benefit the voter to a certain extent since this could motivate the opposition to exert
the effort necessary to warn the voters. The model in this chapter is a cheap talk model and
the incongruence of the opposition only decreases its credibility.
The model in this chapter also shows that for the disciplining effect of the opposition to
work, the government should be concerned about winning the elections. This finding is also
consistent with the model in the first chapter where the reputation cost of climbing down
induces the government to choose congruent policies preemptively. An important difference
between the two models is that the disciplining effect in this chapter works even when the
opposition is not truthful. When the voter is facing moral hazard and adverse selection
problems simultaneously, the government may have to follow the misleading messages of the
opposition.
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Chapter 4
When Do Cosponsors Climb Down?

4.1

Introduction

One of the key normative benchmarks for the performance of a democratic political system
is congruence between the preferences of citizens, and the policy positions and decisions of
politicians. Reelection concerns are expected to ensure that representatives act in accordance
with the preferences of their constituencies. We have empirical evidence to support that in
very broad terms the political system works as expected in Western democracies. Ideological
positions of individual parties, as delineated in their manifestos, change in the same direction
as the shifts in public opinion over time (Adams et al. 2004, 2009). Similarly, the position
of the median party in the legislature corresponds to the preferences of the median citizen
(McDonald et al. 2004, McDonald and Budge 2005). While these results are promising,
they do not necessarily imply that policy outcomes are in agreement with the preferences of
citizens. Parties do not always implement the policies outlined in their manifestos. (Blais et
al. 1993, Imbeau et al. 2001, Tavits and Letki 2009). Research on policy congruence exists
for a smaller number of cases. We have evidence of congruence between public opinion and
policy across American states (Erikson et al. 1993, Lax and Philips 2011) as well as over
time at the national level in UK and US (Soroka and Wlezien 2005, Erikson et al. 2002).
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Despite the rich body of literature on congruence, we do not know whether or how
individual representatives respond to the demands of their constituencies in their decisions
about specific policies. Cross-sectional studies do not examine whether the representatives
take into account changes over time. It is important to learn about the dynamic aspect of
responsiveness because new issues may emerge or public opinion may change. Studies that
examine the shift over time focus on the change from one election to another, hence they
do not answer questions about how representatives act once they are in office. Moreover,
the existing studies are at the level of the party, the legislature or the government. The
relationship between an individual representative and his/her constituency is also important
for the satisfaction of citizens with the political system.
Studying the responsiveness of individual representatives is difficult due to data restrictions. We do not have public opinion data on all policy proposals at the electoral district
level. In this paper, I take advantage of the data on cosponsorship in the US House of Representatives to examine how representatives respond to their constituencies. More specifically,
I examine when representatives decide to withdraw their support from the bills that they
cosponsored. Some scholars use cosponsorship patterns to measure the ideological position
of representatives (Desposato et al. 2012). This does not necessarily mean that voters use
cosponsorship decisions as the primary source of information to assess their representatives.
Nevertheless, if a bill becomes unpopular, the cosponsors of a bill may be held responsible
by voters and interest groups, and the challengers may use this as an opportunity to criticize
the incumbents. With these concerns in mind, the representatives may decide to remove
their names from the bills that they cosponsored. The decisions to climb down from cosponsorship are important because they give us information about how representatives adjust
their decisions when they face criticism from their constituencies.
Anecdotal evidence shows that representatives reconsider their cosponsorship decisions
when their constituency opposes the bill. Consider the case of Breast Cancer Awareness
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Commemorative Coin Act. In June 2015, the bill was introduced to the House by Carolyn
B. Maloney (D-NY), and cosponsored by representatives from both parties. The bill proposed that the proceeds of the coin would go to the Susan G. Komen Foundation. Several
conservative groups opposed the bill on the grounds that the foundation had links to Planned
Parenthood. As a result, 26 Republicans decided to withdraw their support from the bill in
July 2015.1 This case is important in showing that representatives respond to the reaction
of their constituency but that they cannot always predict the reaction accurately.
My argument in this paper is as follows: Representatives use cosponsorship as an opportunity to take positions that would appeal to their constituency. At the time that they make
their cosponsorship decisions, they have some information about the bill but they cannot
perfectly assess all its aspects. They can use the partisan composition of the cosponsors as a
measure for the position of the bill; however, the composition may change over time. Based
on this change, the representatives may learn that they signed on to a bill that would not
be appealing to their constituency. Since the representatives are concerned about reelection, they should take into account the changes over time to decide whether to remain as a
cosponsor or climb down from cosponsorship. As the change over time increases, the likelihood for climbdown is expected to increase as well. The effect of change on the likelihood of
climbdown is mediated by whether the representative is challenged in the general elections
or the primaries. When the primaries are the main concern, an increase in the number of
cosponsors from the opposite party is expected be associated by an increase in the likelihood
of climbdown.
1

http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/247878-house-pulls-breast-cancer-research-bill
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4.2

Change in Partisan Composition and the Probability of Climbdown

Cosponsorship is a very common legislative activity. Around 64% of the bills that were
introduced in the US House of Representatives between 1981 and 2016 were cosponsored by
at least one representative – out of the 108327 bills that were introduced in this period, 69374
had at least one cosponsor. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the number of cosponsors
for this subset of bills. The distribution is skewed to the right with a mean of 23.59 and a
standard deviation of 39.72. The number of cosponsors range between 1 and 432, and the
median is 9.
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Cosponsors
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Among the bills that had at least one cosponsor, about 2% at least one cosponsor withdrew his or her support from the bill. This seems like a small percentage; however, one
should note that climbdowns are not equally distributed across bills. If we limit our analysis
to bills with more than 100 cosponsors, the proportions of bills with at least one climbdown
goes up to about 11%. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the number of cosponsors for
bills with at least one climbdown. Compared to Figure 4.1, the distribution is less skewed
with a mean of 75.3 and a standard deviation of 69.57. The number of cosponsors range
between 1 and 337. Half of the bills in this subset have 50 cosponsors or more.
Figure 4.2: Distribution of Cosponsors for Bills with Climbdowns

While cosponsoring a bill does not directly influence its prospects, it provides legislators
with an opportunity to signal their positions. The target audience of these signals is twofold.
Earlier studies show how the cosponsorship decision of a legislator can give information to
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other legislators about the content of the bill and influence its success (Kessler and Krehbiel
1996, Wilson and Young 1997). More recent studies examine how legislators use cosponsorship to build their reputation for electoral gains (Crisp et al. 2004, Goodliffe et al. 2005,
Crisp et al. forthcoming). Interviews with legislators reveal that the two mechanisms may
interact. Even if legislators make their decisions to cosponsor a bill with electoral considerations in mind, their decisions may influence the opinion of other legislators (Koger 2003).
My argument relies on another way that the internal and the external audiences of the
cosponsorship decisions interact. I argue that the legislators may rely on other legislators’
cosponsorship decisions in order to figure out whether their constituency would approve the
bill.
A legislator can take credit for cosponsoring bills that are favored by his/her constituency.
However, the decision to cosponsor a bill may backfire if the aspects of the bill that were not
obvious are revealed over time in a way that would cause objections from the constituency.
These cases can be used against the legislator at the time of election. After having made the
cosponsorship decision with the best available information that he/she has, the legislator
should be cognizant of any changes in the partisan composition of cosponsors. It is reasonable to assume that bills with more Republican cosponsors would be conceived as more
conservative by voters than those with more Democrat cosponsors. If the partisan composition of the bill changes, this may point out that the information that the legislator had
about the bill at the time of his/her cosponsorship decision was incomplete. If the change
in information is significant enough, the legislator may have to climb down from the bill.
Absolute Partisan Change Hypothesis: A legislator is more likely to remove his/her name
from a bill that he/she cosponsored as the change in partisan composition of cosponsors
increases.
The legislator’s decision to climb down from a bill is expected to be correlated also
with the amount of information that he/she has about the bill at the time he/she makes
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her decision. One piece of information that a legislator has about a bill is the number of
cosponsors. We can argue that each cosponsorship decision provides an additional piece
of information to other legislators. Therefore, we should expect uncertainty about the bill
to decrease as the number of cosponsors on a bill increases. If a legislator makes his/her
cosponsorship decision at a point when there is a high number of cosponsors, he/she is less
likely to climb down later.
Prior Information Hypothesis: A legislator is less likely to remove his/her name from
a bill that he/she cosponsored as the total number of cosponsors (at the time of his/her
cosponsorship decision) increases.
In order to test these hypotheses, I created a dataset that includes cosponsorship information for all the bills introduced in the House of Representatives between 1981 and 2016 (from
the 97th to the 114th Congress), and cosponsored by at least one representative.2 The unit
of analysis is cosponsor-bill. I limit the analysis to Democrat and Republican cosponsors. I
run logistic regression models, where the outcome is a dichotomous variable that takes the
value 1 if the cosponsor removed his/her name from the bill. During the period under study,
I observe 2499 instances of climbdowns. All the models are reported with Congress fixed
effects.
For the absolute partisan change hypothesis, the explanatory variable is the absolute
change in the partisan composition of cosponsors. First, in order to calculate the partisan
composition, I subtract the number of Republican cosponsors from the number of Democrat
cosponsors. Second, for the cosponsors that climb down later, I calculate the change that
occurs between the decision to cosponsor the bill and the decision to remove the name from
the bill. For the cosponsors that do not climb down, the end date is the day the bill becomes
a law or the day the term of the Congress ends. Finally, I take the absolute value of the
2
The data prior to the 97th Congress does not make a distinction between bills and amendment. Furthermore, before 1978 the rules of the House allowed only up to 25 cosponsors.

70

change. To summarize, my measure for the first explanatory variable is the following:

|(Dem. Cosponsors - Rep Cosponsors )End −(Dem. Cosponsors - Rep. Cosponsors)Cosponsor |

Since the absolute partisan change hypothesis is about the association between the likelihood
of climbdown and any change that occurs after the cosponsorship decision, this measure
treats the increases in the direction of more Democrats the same as the increases in the
direction of more Republicans. The predicted sign of the coefficient is positive.
For the prior information hypothesis, the explanatory variable, All Cosponsors, is the
total number of cosponsors up until the day that the cosponsor made his/her decision to
sign on to the bill (including those that signed on on the same day). As the value of this
variable increases, the likelihood of climbdown is expected to decrease. The correlation
between the two explanatory variables is 0.079.
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 4.1.The coefficient for the absolute
change in the partisan composition of cosponsors is negative and statistically significant.
Hence if the cosponsor observes more change in the partisan composition of cosponsors,
he/she is less likely to remove his/her name from the bill later. This contradicts the absolute
partisan change hypothesis. In order to discuss the substantive effect of change on the
likelihood of climbdown, Figure 4.3 plots the predictions from Model 1 against absolute
change in partisan composition. The predictions are calculated for the 97th Congress using
the mean value for the number of cosponsors at the time of cosponsorship. When there
is no change in the partisan composition, the predicted probability of climbdown is 0.28%.
The probability goes down to 0.24% if the change in the partisan composition equals the
sample mean (15.07), and to 0.19% if the change in the partisan composition is one standard
deviation above the sample mean (36.2). The absolute changes in probabilities do not seem
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Table 4.1: Results of Logistic Regression on the Decision to Climb Down
Model 1

Model 2

−0.0093∗

Absolute ∆ Partisan Difference

(0.0013)
−0.0220∗

∆ Partisan Advantage

(0.0007)
All Cosponsors

(Intercept)

Congress FE
N

0.0007∗

0.0002

(0.0003)

(0.0003)

−5.9286∗

−5.9377∗

(0.0844)

(0.0842)

Yes

Yes

1632490

1632490

AIC

36928.6377

36283.5338

BIC

37913.0870

37267.9832

−18384.3188

−18061.7669

log L
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

indicates significance at p < 0.05

high. Given that climbdown is a low probability event, however, the changes are quite
substantial.
Model 1 shows no evidence to support prior information hypothesis. The coefficient for
All Sponsors is statistically significant but it is positive. Hence, as the number of cosponsors
at the time of cosponsorship decision increases, the cosponsor is more likely to remove his/her
name from the bill later. One reason for this unexpected finding may be the variation in
the availability of information. For example, original cosponsors of a bill may have a better
grasp of its content. In order to consider this possibility, I provide robustness checks in the

72

Figure 4.3: Predictions from Model 1

appendix. Model 3 in Table A.1 repeats the analysis for a subset of the data that only
includes the original cosponsors of the bills. The coefficient for All Sponsors is statistically
significant and positive. Model 4 shows that when we limit the dataset to the cosponsors
that sign on to the bills later, the coefficient changes sign and becomes insignificant. The
conclusions for absolute partisan change hypothesis stay the same in both models.
In the appendix, I provide additional robustness checks. Models 5 and 6 repeat the analysis for the subsets of data that include bills proposed by the members of the majority and
the minority, respectively. The coefficients for All Sponsors are not statistically significant in
either model. Model 7 limits the analysis to major bills, defined as bills that have more than
50 cosponsors. These bills are more likely to be salient, which could make representatives
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more responsive to changes in the partisan composition of cosponsorship. The coefficient
forAll Sponsors is negative and statistically significant. In Model 8, which shows the results
of the analysis for minor bills, the coefficient becomes positive and not statistically significant. In all the models, the coefficients for Absolute ∆ Partisan Difference are negative and
statistically significant.

4.3

Change in Partisan Advantage and the Probability
of Climbdown

As discussed in the previous section, we see a decline in the predicted probability of climbdown as the change in partisan composition of cosponsors increases, which is contrary to my
prediction that change increases the likelihood of climbdown. This result suggests that at
least some of the change in the partisan composition of cosponsorship is perceived as positive
by the constituency of the legislator. Previous research shows the cosponsorship decisions of
the members of the Congress are influenced by whether they are challenged in the primaries
or in the general elections (Crisp et al. forthcoming). Consider a Republican who signed
on to a bill with 30 Republican and 10 Democrat cosponsors, and she is challenged in the
primaries for not being conservative enough. If the difference between the Republican and
Democrat cosponsors on the bill increases, this means the bill will be considered more conservative by the constituency, and hence, would not raise any questions about the conservative
credentials of the candidate. If the candidate is challenged in the general elections, however,
being on a conservative bill can be used against her. Given that moderate candidates are
increasingly challenged in the primaries (Hall 2015), my prediction is the following:
Change in Partisan Advantage Hypothesis: A legislator is less likely to remove his/her
name from a bill that he/she cosponsored as the difference between the number of cosponsors
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from his/her party and the number of cosponsors from the opposite party increases after
his/her cosponsorship decision.
Similar to the previous section, the analysis to test this hypothesis is at the cosponsor-bill
level. The outcome variable is dichotomous, and takes the value 1 if the cosponsor removed
his/her name from the bill. Logistic regression results are reported with fixed effects for
Congress. The explanatory variable, ∆ Partisan Advantage, is the change in the number of
cosponsors from the cosponsor’s own party relative to the number of cosponsors from the
opposite party. First, I calculate the difference at two different points in time by subtracting
the number of cosponsors from the opposite party from the number of copartisan cosponsors.
Second, I subtract the difference at the time of cosponsorship from the difference at the end,
i.e. the day of climbdown, the end of the Congress or the day that the bill passed. Hence,
the measure for the explanatory variable is the following:

(Copartisan Cospon. - Other Cospon. )End −(Copartisan Cospon. - Other Cospon.)Cosponsor

As this measure increases, it means that the share of the cosponsor’ partisans among the
cosponsors increased from the time he/she made the decision to cosponsor the bill to the time
that he/she decided to withdraw (or the Congress ended / the bill passed). The expected
sign of the coefficient is negative. As more and more of a cosponsor’s copartisans sing on to
a bill, he/she is less likely to be challenged in the primary based on this particular bill and
hence less likely to climb down. To keep the models consistent, I include All Cosponsors in
this model as well. The correlation between ∆ Partisan Advantage and All Cosponsors is
-0.005.
Model 2 in Table 4.1 shows the results of the analysis. The coefficient for ∆ Partisan
Advantage is negative and statistically significant, which supports the change in partisan
advantage hypothesis. Table A.2 shows the results of robustness checks for the change in
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partisan advantage hypothesis. The conclusion stays the same when I split the dataset into
original cosponsors and cosponsors that sign on later, majority bills and minority bills, major
bills and minor bills.
In order to discuss the substantive effects, Figure 4.4 plots the predicted probability of
climbdown against change in partisan advantage. I calculate the predictions for the mean
value of All Cosponsors and the 97th Congress. When the partisan composition of cosponsors
does not change, the predicted probability of climbdown is 0.27%. For the observations with
positive values of ∆ Partisan Advantage, the mean value of this variable is 18.91 and the
standard deviation is 22.61. In other words, the increase in the difference between copartisan
cosponsors and cosponsors from the opposite party is around 19 representatives on average.
The predicted value of climbdown goes down to 0.17% for this mean value of increase. If
we increase the value of ∆ Partisan Advantage by one standard deviation, the predicted
value of climbdown decreases further to 0.10%. For the observations, for which the number
of copartisan cosponsors decrease relative to the cosponsors from the opposite party, the
mean value of ∆ Partisan Advantage is -13.63, and the standard deviation is 18.67. For an
observation with mean value for decrease, the predicted probability of climbdown is 0.35%,
which is about the twice of the predicted probability for an observation with no change.
If the decrease is one standard deviation away from the mean, the predicted probability of
climbdown goes up to 0.54%.
Similar to Model 1, Model 2 shows no evidence for the prior information hypothesis.
The coefficient for All Cosponsors is positive and not statistically significant. Two possible
reasons for the lack of support for the prior information hypothesis are as follows. First, the
number of cosponsors on a bill is not a very precise measure of information. The legislators
may use other source of information at his/her disposal such as the opinion of interest groups.
Second, the total number of cosponsors may indicate the salience of the bill which may be
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Figure 4.4: Predictions from Model 2

confounding the results. If a bill is more salient, the legislator may be more likely to be
assessed on the basis of his/her cosponsorship decision.
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4.4

Conclusion

Legislative activities provide the representatives with important opportunities to signal their
positions to voters (Mayhew 1974, Martin and Vanberg 2008), to other representatives in
the legislature (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996) as well as to the party elites (Slapin and Proksch
2010). In this paper, I study the cosponsorship decisions of the representatives in the US
House of Representatives to examine how they adjust their positions in response to the reaction from their constituencies by using the information that they receive from the cosponsorship decisions of other representatives.
I argue that the representatives take into account the preferences of their constituency
in their cosponsorship decisions. They make their decisions using the best information that
they have; however, they cannot always accurately predict how the bill will be perceived by
their constituency. Moreover, the partisan composition of the bill’s cosponsors may change
over time. If the bill that a representative cosponsored receives more and more cosponsors
from the opposite party, his/her competitor in the primaries may accuse him/her of being
ideologically closer to the opposite party. In order to prevent this situation, the representative
may have to climb down from the bill. My analysis shows that there is a relationship between
the change in the partisan composition of cosponsors after a representative makes his/her
cosponsorship decision and the likelihood that he/she decides to remove his/her name from
the bill later. More specifically, a legislator is less likely to remove his/her name from a
bill that he/she cosponsored as the number of cosponsors from his/her own party increase
relative to the number of cosponsors from the opposite party.
Future research can take at least two directions. First, the theoretical expectation for
the representative’s decision to climb down depends on whether he/she is challenged in the
primary or in the general election. Using the timing of elections and the margin of victory, I
can provide more convincing evidence about how representatives respond to the preferences
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of their constituencies. Second, the availability of data for more than three decades allows
us to see whether polarization increased in this period by examining whether representatives
are more likely to respond to partisan differences over time.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

I examine the role of opposition parties in policy making in democratic systems, where a
majority government generally enjoys exceptional power over legislation. In these systems,
the legislative opposition can use the procedural prerogatives at its disposal such as proposing
amendments but they typically fail. I consider the possibility that the use of these procedures,
even when they fail, can enhance government responsiveness. I argue that the effectiveness
of opposition parties depends on their ability to credibly transmit information, which is not
always commensurate with their electoral strength or seat share in the legislature.
In the first theoretical chapter, I propose a formal model that identifies the conditions
under which an opposition party can warn the voters against an incongruent policy proposal
and convince them to exert the effort to put pressure on the government. The opposition
party is more likely to confront the government when its chances of election are sufficiently
low and the opposition activists are sufficiently distant in terms of their ideological positions
from the government (as well as the voter and the opposition party itself). If the confrontations between the government and the opposition are too frequent, the opposition’s
message loses its credibility. The ideal situation for the voters’ welfare is the presence of an
electorally viable opposition party with moderate activists. The model also shows that the
effect of the opposition on the voters’ welfare is not always observable since the presence of a
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responsible opposition party may induce the government to preemptively adjust its policies
in accordance with the voters’ preferences.
In the second theoretical chapter, I consider a formal model that examines when the
opposition provides the voters with accurate information under different circumstances. In
this model, the voters do not have the means to verify the accuracy of this information
or to precisely identify the policy preferences of the government and the opposition party.
Consistent with the first theoretical chapter, I find that for the opposition’s messages to be
credible, the voters should believe that the opposition is congruent. Similarly, the model
shows that the disciplining effect of the opposition works only when the government cares
enough about reelection. Unlike the first theoretical chapter, the cheap talk model shows
the double-edged nature of the opposition’s participation in debate. When the reputation
of the opposition is sufficiently high, the government will have to follow its recommendation
even in cases where it is misleading. This happens because the government does not have
the means to credibly communicate that it is the congruent type and that its policy proposal
is beneficial for the voters.
In the final chapter, I examine when legislators withdraw their support from the bills that
they cosponsored using an original dataset of cosponsorship in the US House of Representatives. The climbdowns from cosponsorship are important in showing how the legislators
respond to the preferences of their constituencies. I argue that the legislators can glean
information about the bills by using the cosponsorship decisions of their counterparts. My
analysis shows that a legislator is more likely to remove his/her name from a bill that he/she
cosponsored when the number of his/her opponents that cosponsored the bill increases relative to the number of his/her copartisans.
My dissertation generates two sets of theoretical questions for future research. First, what
are the conditions under which governments can glean useful information from opposition
parties? The models in both theoretical chapters assume that the government and the
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opposition have perfect information about the outcome of policy alternatives. In cases where
this assumption does not hold, there is room for the parties to learn from each other. This is
particularly relevant since parties may have expertise in different policy areas and information
about the demands of different constituencies. If legislative debate can help parties learn
from each other, this may be another way in which the presence of an opposition improves
the voters’ welfare. Given the policy and election incentives of the parties, this potential
salutary effect may not always take place.
Second, when does the presence of an opposition party benefit the government? This
question is particularly important for institutional change. There is variation both across
countries and over time in the opportunities for the participation of the opposition in legislative policymaking. The rules regulating the opposition’s participation are at least partly
determined by the party in government. Therefore, the potential benefit that the government receives from the participation of the opposition would be critical in explaining the
institutional variation.
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Appendix A
Additional Material for Chapter 2

A.1

Proof of Proposition 5

Lemma: In the informative equilibrium, if there is an objection, then one of the following
is true:
(a) G∗ < ω < O1∗ < V
(b) G∗ < ω < V < O1∗
(c) G∗ < ω < O2∗ and V < O2∗ < X
(d) G∗ < ω < O3∗ and X < O3∗ < AO
Proof: Case (a): If O1∗ < V , then by substitution O2∗ < V and O3∗ < X. Case (c): If
< X, then by substitution O3∗ < X. Case (d): If O3∗ > X, then by substitution O2∗ > X.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider the cases in Lemma. Case (a): If O1∗ < X, then
∂O1∗
X > AO − c. If X > AO − c, then
< 0. Case (b): The threshold is V. Case (c): If
β
∂O2∗
∂O3∗
O2∗ < X, then X > AO − c − dO . If X > AO − c − dO , then
< 0. Case (d):
< 0.
β
β
O2∗

A.2

Proof of Proposition 6

Consider the cases in Lemma. In cases (a), (c), and (d), the threshold is increasing in AO .
In case (b), the threshold is V .
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Appendix B
Additional Material for Chapter 3

B.1

Proof of Proposition 2

Let a, b, c, and d be the probabilities that the voter will reelect the government upon
observing message and policy pairs (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1), respectively.
Let α1 through α8 be the probabilities that the government will choose policy x = 0
under the following conditions:
α1 = P r(x = 0|ω = 0, tI = U, m = 0)
α2 = P r(x = 0|ω = 0, tI = U, m = 1)
α3 = P r(x = 0|ω = 0, tI = B, m = 0)
α4 = P r(x = 0|ω = 0, tI = B, m = 1)
α5 = P r(x = 0|ω = 1, tI = U, m = 0)
α6 = P r(x = 0|ω = 1, tI = U, m = 1)
α7 = P r(x = 0|ω = 1, tI = B, m = 0)
α8 = P r(x = 0|ω = 1, tI = B, m = 1)
Case 1: bg > bb :
First, consider an equilibrium where α3 = 1 and α4 = 0.
Given the incentives of the government, α3 = 1 implies α1 = 1. Similarly, α4 = 0 implies
α6 = 0.
Consider the three values that α8 can take. First, assume α8 = 1. Then I have c =
11
H(0, BC ) and d = (βc
G , βO ). Given the government’s incentives, c < d implies α8 = 0.
Contradiction. Second, assume α8 = q > 0. Then I have c = H(0, βO ) and d = (1, βO ). c < d
implies α8 = 0. Contradiction. Third, assume that α8 = 0. Then I have d = H(βG , βO ).
Bayes’ rule does not pin down the beliefs for c. Hence, the only value that α8 can take is 0.
Given the values α1 , α3 , α6 and α8 , using the Bayes’ rule, I have a = d = H(βG , βO ).
Bayes’ rule does not pin down the beliefs for b and c.
Given α1 = α3 = 1, there are five different pairs of values that α5 and α7 can take:
(i) α5 = α7 = 0
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(ii) α5 = 0 and α7 = q > 0
(iii) α5 = 0 and α7 = 1
(iv) α5 = q and α7 = 1
(v) α5 = α7 = 1
In all these cases, a > b and a = d, which implies b < d. For these values, the bad
opposition announces m = 0 when ω = 1.
Second, consider an equilibrium where α3 = q > 0 and α4 = 0.
Given the incentives of the government α3 = q > 0 implies α1 = 1 and α5 = 0. Similarly,
α4 = 0 implies α6 = 0. For the same reasons as above, the only value that α8 can take is 0.
00
Given the values α1 , α3 , α6 and α8 , using the Bayes’ rule, I have a = H(βc
G , βO ) >
H(βG , βO ), b = H(0, βO ) and d = (βG , βO ). Bayes’ rule does not pin down the beliefs for c.
There are three different values that α7 can take:
(i) α7 = 0
(ii) α7 = q > 0
(iii) α7 = 1
In cases (i) and (ii), b < d; therefore, the bad opposition announces m = 0 when ω = 1.
In case (iii), for the bad opposition to announce m = 1 when ω = 1, i need to have a − d ≥ bb
In order to have α3 = q > 0, i need to have a − b = bb . Given the values of a, b and d
calculated above, a > d > b. Contradiction.
Case 2: bg < bb :
First, consider an equilibrium where α3 = 1 and α4 = 0.
Given the incentives of the government, α3 = 1 implies α1 = 1 and α5 = 1. Given
α1 = α3 , I have a = H(βG , βO ). Bayes’ rule does not pin down the beliefs for b. The utilities
of the good and bad oppositions from announcing m = 0 when ω = 0 are the following:
uOg (m = 0, ω = 0) = bg + 1 − a
uOb (m = 0, ω = 0) = bb + 1 − a
There are three values that α7 can take:
(i) α7 = 0: Given the government’s incentives, I should have a − b = bb The utilities of
the good and bad oppositions from announcing m = 0 when ω = 1 are the following:
uOg (m = 0, ω = 1) = βG (−bg − bb ) + bg + 1 − b
uOb (m = 0, ω = 1) = 1 − b
(ii) α7 = q7 > 0. Given the government’s incentives, I should have a − b = bb The utilities
of the good and bad oppositions from announcing m = 0 when ω = 1 are the following:
uOg (m = 0, ω = 1) = (bb + bg )[βG (q7 − 1) − q7 ] + bg + 1 − b
uOb (m = 0, ω = 1) = 1 − b
(iii) α7 = 1. Given the government’s incentives, I should have a − b ≥ bb The utilities of
the good and bad oppositions from announcing m = 0 when ω = 1 are the following:
uOg (m = 0, ω = 1) = 1 − a
uOb (m = 0, ω = 1) = bb + 1 − a
Similarly, there are three values that α6 can take:
(a) α6 = 0. Given the government’s incentives, α4 = α6 = 0 implies α8 = 0 and I should
have c − d ≤ bg . Bayes’ rule does not pin down the beliefs for c. I have d = H(βG , βO ).
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The utilities of the good and bad oppositions from announcing m = 1 when ω = 1 are the
following:
uOg (m = 1, ω = 1) = bg + 1 − d
uOb (m = 1, ω = 1) = 1 − d
(b) α6 = q6 where 0 < q6 < 1. Given the government’s incentives, α4 = 0 and α6 = q6 > 0
implies α8 = 0 and I should have c − d = bg . Using Bayes’ rule, I have c = H(1, βO ) and
d = (βb11 , βO ) < H(βG , βO ) The utilities of the good and bad oppositions from announcing
m = 1 when ω = 1 are the following:
uOg (m = 1, ω = 1) = bg + 1 − d − 2βq6 bg
uOb (m = 1, ω = 1) = βq6 (bb − bg ) + 1 − d
(c) α6 = 1 In this case, α8 can take one of the three values:
(c-i)α8 = 0 Given the government’s incentives, bg ≤ c − d ≤ bb . Using Bayes’ rule I
have c = H(1, βO ) and d = H(0, βO ) The utilities of the good and bad oppositions from
announcing m = 1 when ω = 1 are the following:
uOg (m = 1, ω = 1) = βG (d − c − bg ) + (bg + 1 − d)
uOb (m = 1, ω = 1) = βG (bb + d − c) + (1 − d)
(c-ii)α8 = q8 where 0 < q8 < 1 Given the government’s incentives, bg ≤ c − d = bb . Using
10
Bayes’ rule I have c = H(βc
G , βO ) > H(βG , βO ) and d = H(0, βO ) The utilities of the good
and bad oppositions from announcing m = 1 when ω = 1 are the following:
uOg (m = 1, ω = 1) = βG [(bb + bg )(q8 − 1)] + bg + 1 − d − q8 (bg + bb )
uOb (m = 1, ω = 1) = 1 − d
(c-iii) α8 = 1 Given the government’s incentives, c − d = bb . Using Bayes’ rule I have
d = H(0, βO ) Bayes’ rule does not pin down the beliefs for c The utilities of the good and
bad oppositions from announcing m = 1 when ω = 1 are the following:
uOg (m = 1, ω = 1) = 1 − c
uOb (m = 1, ω = 1) = bb + 1 − c
Now I need to pair each of the cases (i), (ii), and (iii) with each of the cases (a), (b),
(c-i), (c-ii) and (c-iii).
Cases (i-a), (ii-a) and (iii-a): I have a = d > b. The bad opposition announces m = 0
when ω = 1.
Cases (i-b), (ii-b) and (iii-b): When I write the incentive constraints of the bad opposition
in the cases when ω = 0 and ω = 1, I obtain two inequalities. Summing up the two
inequalities, I reach q6 ≥ 1, which contradicts the assumption that q6 < 1.
Cases (i-c-i), (ii-c-i) and (iii-c-i): When I write the incentive constraints of the good
opposition in cases when ω = 0 and ω = 1, I obtain two inequalities. When I sum the two
inequalities, I reach bb ≤ bg , which contradicts my initial assumption.
Cases (i-c-ii) and (ii-c-ii): I have b < d, which implies that the bad opposition will
announce m = 0 when ω = 1
Case(iii-c-ii): For the bad opposition to announce m = 1 when ω = 1, I need a − d ≥ bb .
Since I also have c > a > d and c − d = b, there is a contradiction.
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Cases (i-c-iii) and (ii-c-iii): For the good opposition to announce m = 1 when ω = 1, I
need b − c ≥ βG (−bg − bb ) + bg Since a = c = H(βG , βO ), I should have b − a ≥ βG (bg − bb ) + bg
If I plug a − b = bb , I have βG (bg + bb ) ≥ bg + bb . Contradiction.
Case (iii-c-iii): For the good opposition to announce m = 0 when ω = 0, I need a − d ≤
bg − βG (bg + d − c). Since a = c = H(βG , βO ), I should have c − d ≤ bg − βG bg + βG (c − d).
Hence c − d ≤ bg . Since c − d = bb and bg < bb , there is a contradiction.
Second, I consider and equilibrium where α3 = q > 0 and α4 = 0. The proof is similar.

B.2

Proposition 4

In the baseline model, the following equilibria exist in mixed strategies:
(a) The good government always chooses the policy that matches the state of the world.
The bad government chooses policy x = 0 with probability q when ω = 0, and with probability r when ω = 1, respectively. This equilibrium exists, provided:
bg ≥ bb

(B.1)

∗ ∗
c ∗ ∗
H(βc
G (q , r ), βO ) − H(βG (q , r ), βO ) = bb

(B.2)

0

1

where
0
βc
G =

1
βG
βG
and βc
G =
βG + (q + r)(1 − βG )
βG + (2 − q − r)(1 − βG )

(b) The good government always chooses x = 0 irrespective of the state of the world. The
bad government chooses policy x = 0 with probability q when ω = 0, and with probability
r when ω = 1, respectively. This equilibrium exists, provided:
bg ≤ bb

(B.1)

H(βc
G , βO ) − H(0, βO ) = bb

(B.2)

0

where
0
βc
G =

2βG
2βG + (q + r)(1 − βG )

(c) The good government always chooses x = 0 when ω = 0, and chooses x = 0 with
probability q when ω = 1, respectively. The bad government always chooses x = 1 irrespective of the state of the world. This equilibrium exists, provided:
bg ≤ bb

(B.1)

1
H(1, βO ) − H(βc
G , βO ) = bg

(B.2)
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where
1
βc
G =

(1 − q)βG
(1 − q)βG + 2(1 − βG )
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Appendix C
Robustness Checks
The tables below repeat the analysis in Chapter 4 for different subsets of the dataset.
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Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

Congress FE
N
AIC
BIC
log L

(Intercept)

Absolute ∆
Partisan Diff.
All Cosponsors

Subset

Table A.1: Robustness Checks for Change in Partisan Composition
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Original
Not Original
Majority
Minority
Major
Cosponsors
Cosponsors
Bills
Bills
Bills
∗
∗
∗
∗
−0.0074
−0.0114
−0.0099
−0.0068
−0.0125∗
(0.0019)
(0.0017)
(0.0015)
(0.0023)
(0.0014)
∗
∗
0.0048
−0.0008
0.0001
0.0019
−0.0017∗
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
(0.0006)
(0.0004)
∗
∗
∗
∗
−6.0911
−5.8105
−5.8143
−6.1573
−5.9274∗
(0.1256)
(0.1141)
(0.1004)
(0.1557)
(0.1393)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
544932
1087558
1038955
593535
916464
12703.4128
23995.7649
25373.3982
11240.5253
21967.5362
13600.0862
24947.7205
26321.6963
12144.0334
22905.7985
−6271.7064
−11917.8824
−12606.6991
−5540.2626
−10903.7681
Model 8
Minor
Bills
−0.0740∗
(0.0079)
0.0037
(0.0027)
−5.6568∗
(0.1156)
Yes
716026
14687.3223
15605.8400
−7263.6611
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Standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05

Congress FE
N
AIC
BIC
log L

(Intercept)

∆ Partisan
Advantage
All Cosponsors

Subset

Table A.2: Robustness Checks for Change in Partisan Advantage
Model 9
Model 10
Model 11
Model 12
Model 13
Original
Not Original
Majority
Minority
Major
Cosponsors
Cosponsors
Bills
Bills
Bills
∗
∗
∗
∗
−0.0222
−0.0221
−0.0194
−0.0277
−0.0201∗
(0.0011)
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
(0.0013)
(0.0007)
∗
∗
0.0045
−0.0015
−0.0003
0.0009
−0.0013∗
(0.0005)
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
(0.0006)
(0.0004)
∗
∗
∗
∗
−6.0994
−5.8200
−5.8299
−6.1373
−6.0595∗
(0.1253)
(0.1139)
(0.1003)
(0.1552)
(0.1375)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
544932
1087558
1038955
593535
916464
12426.6206
23625.5456
25032.7826
10940.7776
21449.6354
13323.2939
24577.5013
25981.0807
11844.2858
22387.8977
−6133.3103
−11732.7728
−12436.3913
−5390.3888
−10644.8177
Model 14
Minor
Bills
−0.0742∗
(0.0045)
0.0062∗
(0.0027)
−5.8135∗
(0.1156)
Yes
716026
14561.6385
15480.1562
−7200.8192

